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I. INTRODUCTnON
The Senate confirmation hearing of a nominee to the United States Supreme
Court is typically an occasion to ascertain his or her political predilections.'
Aware of this, Ruth Bader Ginsburg sought to center her confirmation hearing
on a deeper discussion of the complex dynamics of judging. "Let me try," she
said, "to state in a nutshell how I view the work of judging. My approach, I
believe, is neither liberal nor conservative.,
2
Despite her efforts, the media persisted in assigning a label to then-Judge
Ginsburg and, pointing to her performance as a former law school professor
and a federal appellate judge, portrayed her as "moderate. 3 In agreement,
Republican senators who applauded her nomination joined in labeling her as
"moderate."4 After Justice Ginsburgjoined the Supreme Court and served for
a term, a law review article concluded, on the basis of her first-term voting
behavior, that she "was indeed a moderate."'
What does "moderate" mean? Politically? Judicially? Does "neither
liberal nor conservative" necessarily equate with moderate? Or for that
matter, do the labels liberal, conservative, and moderate meaningfully portray
Justice Ginsburg's writing and decisionmaking? Conventional political labels
suffer from a number of shortcomings. They carry interpretative baggage that
may badly mischaracterize the person being labeled; they tend to reflect the
perceptions and beliefs of the person assigning the label; they are shorthand
* Class of 1999, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
** Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
See generally Henry Paul Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101
HARv. L. REV. 1202 (1988)(commenting on the political significance of the Supreme Court
appointment process); William G. Ross, The Supreme Court Appointment Process: A Search
for Synthesis, 57 ALB. L. REV. 993 (1994)(surveying the problems associated with the Supreme
Court appointment process and proposing reform measures).
2 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 103d Cong. 51
(1993) [hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg).
3 See David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, A Frankfurter, Not a Hot Dog, NEWSWEEK, June 8,
1993, at 29.
4 See. e.g., 139 CONG. REc. S10085 (daily ed. August 2, 1993)(statement of Sen. Grassley
("Judge Ginsburg showed us that, while she is a political liberal, she is a judicial moderate.")).
5 Joyce Anne Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Preliminary Assessment, 26
U. TOL L. REV. 1, 11 (1994).
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descriptions that foreclose careful and continued scrutiny of actual behavior. 6
For these reasons, overused labels such as liberal, conservative, or moderate
obscure rather than illuminate 7 And, in our opinion, they are inadequate to
describe Justice Ginsburg's dynamic approach to the complex issues of legal
process.'
This article sets aside the familiar political labels and engages in a deeper
analysis of what Justice Ginsburg has done and said. What prompted Justice
Ginsburg's reputation as a moderate may be, as a survey of her judicial
opinions suggests, her willingness to accommodate a number of differing,
sometimes contrasting concerns when crafting a judicial opinion. For
6 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALLTHE DIFFERENCE 173-77 (1990), for a general survey
of labeling theory and its criticisms.
' Justice Ginsburg similarly questions the utility of conventional political labels in
describing the tenor of judicial action. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 41, 44 (1986) [hereinafter Ginsburg,
Interpretations]; see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A "Liberal" or
"Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539, 546 (1981) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Activism].
In addressing criticisms that the Supreme Court has been swayed by both right-wing and left-
wing litigants, Ginsburg wrote:
I asked then, and I ask again now, whether it is fair to conclude from the business that
litigants of various political persuasions bring to court that, in the United States legal
system, calls for judicial intervention, for intrusive review of legislative and executive
decisions, depend less upon the challenger's "liberal" or "conservative" ideology, and
more upon the practical question of whose ox is being gored.
Ginsburg, Interpretations, supra this note, at 44. To express her point that labels of liberal and
conservative are inadequate to explain the dynamics of decision-making, Ginsburg quotes a
passage from Gilbert & Sullivan's lolanthe:
When in that House M.P.'s divide
They've got to leave [their] brains outside
And vote just as their leaders tell 'em to
They can do this thanks to the providence:
That Nature always does contrive
That ev'ry boy and ev'ry gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative.
Ginsburg, Activism, supra, at 557 (alterations in original).
" Peter Huber, a former law clerk for Judge Ginsburg, commented: "Ihe beauty of Ruth
Ginsburg is that she doesn't readily admit to categorization. The labels don't fit." Tony Mauro,
Judicial Journey Helped to Shape Court Nominee, USA TODAY, June 18, 1993, at 10A. Similar
commentary is offered by Richard Taranto, a former law clerk to Judge Robert Bork: "What
makes her extraordinary is that in area after area, she comes to cases with a single-minded
dedication to follow the legal standards as they exist ... It's much harder to pin a substantive
label on her." Barbara Franklin, Business is Upbeat: Ginsburg's Record Shows Fairness, Lack
of Bias, N.Y. L.J., June 17, 1993, at 5.
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instance, Justice Ginsburg's procedural decisions evince a strong belief in the
ideal of a person's "day in court."9 Justice Ginsburg has allowed litigants to
proceed with their cases despite their apparent difficulty in overcoming
procedural barriers such as timeliness'0 and mootness." Yet, she has also on
occasion dismissed cases involving important substantive issues on narrow
procedural grounds, such as lack of standing. 2
Analysis of these cases on their own terms and in light of a larger
framework of process values reveals the complexity of Justice Ginsburg's
philosophy of process and procedure3-a philosophy often masked by
political labels. This article engages in a detailed analysis of Justice
Ginsburg's approach to the procedural aspects of legal process.' 4 To aid in
this endeavor, the article pays particular attention to her decisions in the
context of the most complicated, and therefore revealing, procedural device:
the class action.' 5 Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in the asbestos class
action, Amchem Products v. Windsor,6 discussed later, lays open a complex
array of competing concerns undergirding procedural decisionmaking.
Amchem and her other judicial opinions in class action cases offer beginning
insight into her jurisprudence of process and procedure.' 7
' See J. Stratton Shartel, Ginsburg's Opinions Reveal Willingness to Grant Access to
Litigants, INSIDE L1TIG., Aug. 1993, at 1; see also, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C.
Cir. 1991)(deciding that a military service person's challenge of an FDA regulation permitting
use of unauthorized drugs on military personnel without their consent was not moot,
notwithstanding the termination of the military situation creating the need to invoke the
regulation).
"o See, e.g., Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(holding that
plaintiffs were entitled to an immediate right of appeal even though the district court did not
technically enter final judgment in a separate document pursuant to FRCP 58). See also infra
notes 19-74 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also infra notes 63-74
and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997)(requiring a
showing of actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete rather than
an interest shared generally by the public at large in order to confer standing to sue). See also
infra notes 160-175 and accompanying text.
13 By "process" we mean "legal method"--that is, the manner in which judges reach
decisions in cases and articulate reasons for those decisions. By "procedure" we mean specific
litigation procedures (such as summary judgment motions) and procedural requirements (such
as subject matter jurisdiction and standing).
14 One caveat is in order. Our assessment of Justice Ginsburg's procedural jurisprudence
is based on a relatively limited universe of information. Our views are therefore preliminary and
serve as a base for further inquiry.
" The class action device is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
16 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
" Amchem involved the class settlement of asbestos litigation, a legal phenomenon that has
posed a formidable challenge to the institutional values of the judicial system. See Georgine v.
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Part I of this article sketches major procedural themes in Justice
Ginsburg's work as a scholar and as a jurist. Part H constructs a conceptual
framework of process values to better ground our later assessment of those
themes. Part IV revisits, in depth, the themes in Justice Ginsburg's work,
employing the process values framework in the context of class action
procedure. Finally, Part V offers a description of Justice Ginsburg's
jurisprudence of process and procedure that is not laden with the baggage of
common political labels. We describe a "values proceduralism."
H. THEMES IN JUSTICE GINSBURG'S JURISPRUDENCE OF LEGAL PROCESS
Justice Ginsburg's views of process and procedure, as reflected in her
writings, do not lend themselves to neat political labels. They reflect diverse
themes that defy easy characterization. As Justice Ginsburg remarked at her
Senate confirmation hearing, her prior judicial opinions and academic writings
are "the most tangible, reliable indicator of [her] attitude, outlook, approach
and style."'8 This Part follows her lead. It casts aside conventional labels and
explores her judicial and scholarly writings to ascertain general themes
concerning process and procedure. The major themes of her writings include
litigant access, court efficiency, and judicial integrity.
A. Litigant Access
A theme that percolates through Justice Ginsburg's judicial opinions is
open court access for aggrieved individuals.'9 As a Circuit Judge of the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Ginsburg sometimes
disfavored the perfunctory application of threshold procedural requirements,
such as the timeliness of appeal,2' standing2' and mootness,22 to bar full
development of the merits of a case.
For example, in Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,' Judge Ginsburg argued that the mechanical
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals
remarked that "[elvery decade presents a few great cases that force the judicial system to choose
between forging a solution to a major social problem on the one hand, and preserving its
institutional values on the other. This is such a case." Id.
n Hearings, supra note 2, at 52.
'9 See Shartel, supra note 9, at 1.
2 See, e.g., Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 781 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Spann v. Colonial
Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
2 See. e.g., Doe v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
2 See id.
23 781 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1986). At the outset, we note that our assessment of cases does
650
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construction of the appeal period should not preclude an appeal of an
unfavorable, but substantively important, decision of the lower court.' The
Center for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. ("CNR"), an organization that
promotes nuclear safety, sought to enjoin a final decision of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission ("NRC") allowing amendments to a nuclear power
plant's operating license.25 The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
final orders of the NRC.26 Nevertheless, in the same opinion, the court also
reached the merits of CNR's National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA")
claim." On defendants' subsequent motion for clarification, the court
amended its opinion to reflect a lack of jurisdiction over the NEPA claim as
well.2" CNR then filed its notice of appeal within sixty days after the
amendment of the opinion, but after the sixty-day appeal period following the
issuance of the original order.29
The defendants argued that the appeal was untimely pursuant to Rule 4 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP").3 ° CNR contended that
the defendants' motion for clarification tolled the sixty-day period because it
was a "motion to alter or amend the judgment" made under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 59(e).3 Defendants responded that the motion was
not reveal a definitive trend or approach. Rather, our survey of Justice Ginsburg's writings
indicates her tendencies or leanings.
2 See id. at 946 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2 See id. at 937.
26 See id (finding no subject matter jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and
28 U.S.C. § 2342(4)).
27 See id. at 938.
28 See id.
2 See id.
30 See id. at 939. A notice of appeal must be filed within 60 days after entry of the
"judgment" of the district court. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a). A judgment is entered within the
meaning of FRAP 4(a) "when it is entered in compliance with Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure." FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(7). FRCP 58 requires that the "judgment" be
set forth in a separate document. See FED. R. Civ. P. 58. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a)
requires that the clerk of the court enter the judgment on the civil docket. FED. R. Civ. P. 79(a).
3" See Center for Nuclear Responsibility, 781 F.2d at 939. FRAP 4(a)(4) provides, in part:
If a timely motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the district court
by any party... (iii) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment[.) ... mhe time for
appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of any
of the above motions shall have no effect.
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4) (1979)(amended 1993). FRCP 59(e) provides: "A motion to alter or
amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment." FED.
R. Civ. P. 59(e).
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made pursuant to FRCP 60(b)(1), and accordingly, did not toll the appeal
period.32
The Court of Appeals agreed with the defendants.3" The majority noted an
absence of definitive authority as to whether a court may correct errors in
legal reasoning through a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. 4 'The tension between Rule
59(e) and Rule 60(b)," the court said, "is generated by the competing goals of
finality of judgments and rendering justice to particular litigants."35 Faced
with this divide, the court held that Rule 58 is to be "applied mechanically.
36
Since the original order complied with the "separate document" requirement
of FRCP 58 and the filing requirement of FRCP 79(a), it was a "final
judgment" within the meaning of FRAP 4.37 Therefore, according to the
majority, the defendants' motion to clarify was not a FRCP 59(e) motion and
CNR's notice of appeal was untimely.38
In a rare dissent,39 Judge Ginsburg argued that CNR should not have been
denied its appeal.4 CNR was uncertain of the proper court in which to bring
its claim.41 Judge Ginsburg observed that Congress had provided a statutory
remedy for litigants in CNR's situation,42 but the provision had apparently
escaped the district court's attention because it was enacted shortly before the
court dismissed the case.43 Nonetheless, she was opposed to a remand of the
case:
[I]t would be a curious procedure indeed to remand this aging matter to the
district court so that a district judge could decide whether or not to ticket as a
"transfer" the parties' return trip here. Nor is such a convoluted procedure
32 See Center for Nuclear Responsibility, 781 F.2d at 939. FRCP 60(b) states, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect[.] ...A motion under this
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
33 See Center for Nuclear Responsibility, 781 F.2d at 937.
See id. at 939.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 See id.
38 See id. at 940.
39 As discussed below, Justice Ginsburg rarely writes dissenting opinions. See infra notes
133-140 and accompanying text.
o See Center for Nuclear Responsibility, 781 F.2d at 946 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
41 See id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 943 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
43 See id. at 944 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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necessary to a fair decision: all the considerations relevant to "the interest of
justice" appear from the record to be within our plain view."
Judge Ginsburg also criticized the majority's rigid application of FRCP
59.45 "The mechanical analysis offered by the court does not persuade me that
we lack power to hear this case. On the contrary, the case belongs in this
forum. . . .and we should accord these litigants their long-sought day in
court."' In Justice Ginsburg's estimation, the Court of Appeals should have
heard the merits of CNR's appeal.47
Timeliness was also an issue in Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc.," in which
a black resident of the District of Columbia and two non-profit organizations
dedicated to the interest of housing equality challenged real estate advertise-
ments featuring exclusively white models.49 After a complex series of
procedural steps,' the lower court dismissed the claims.5 The defendants
argued that the plaintiff's subsequent appeal was premature because the
district court did not set forth its final judgment in a separate document
pursuant to FRCP 58.52
Writing for the majority, Judge Ginsburg observed that FRCP 58 "must be
applied in such a way as to favor the right to appeal."5 3 She disfavored the
"mindless" application of FRCP 58.' Rather,
so long as "it is clear that the district court has intended a final, appealable
judgment, mechanical application of the separate-judgment rule should not be
used to require the pointless formality of returning to the district court for
ministerial entry of judgment; instead, the right to immediate appeal is
favored."55
U Id. at 945 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45 See id. at 946 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6 Id.
41 See id.
4' 899 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
49 See id. at 25-26.
' See id. at 26. The case before the Court of Appeals was a consolidation of actions against
two unrelated sets of defendants. See id. In the first action, the defendants consisted of an
owner and manager of a residential condominium in Virginia and a development corporation.
See id In the second action, the defendants were an advertising agency and its owner. See id.
The case was consolidated in district court. See id The district court made a ruling in favor of
the defendants, which plaintiffs appealed. See id The appeal was cut short when the
defendants moved successfully in the Court of Appeals to dismiss for want of finality. See id.
The district court then issued a final judgment in favor of the defendants. See id.
"' See id.
52 See id. at 31.
13 Id. at 32 (quoting Matter of Seiscom Delta, Inc., 857 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1988)).
4 See id. at 32 n.4 (citing United States v. Perez, 736 F.2d 236, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1984)).
" Id. at 32 (quoting Seiscom, 857 F.2d at 283).
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Accordingly, Judge Ginsburg found the lower court's decision final for the
purpose of appellate review."'
Spann also presented a standing issue.57 Although the defendants alleged
harm that affected only their noneconomic interests, Judge Ginsburg found
that the defendants had standing." The defendants' ads, she said, had a
destructive effect on the plaintiffs' efforts to educate the public about anti-
discriminatory housing practices.59 The plaintiffs incurred "concrete drains
on their time and resources" in redoubling their efforts to educate the
community.' Judge Ginsburg described the suit as "traditional grist for the
judicial mill.""' Thus, she determined the plaintiffs had suffered an injury
sufficient to confer them standing.
Judge Ginsburg also interpreted narrowly another threshold procedural
doctrine, mootness,62 to afford relatively open court access to individuals
raising substantial questions of federal law. In Doe v. Sullivan,63 a military
serviceman and his wife challenged Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
regulations" authorizing the Department of Defense ("DOD") to use
unapproved drugs in certain military situations without obtaining military
personnels' informed consent.' The FDA, pursuant to the regulation, issued
consent waivers allowing the DOD to administer certain drugs during the Gulf
War.' The district court dismissed the suit and Doe appealed.67 While the
appeal was pending, the Gulf War ended, and the DOD notified the FDA that
the need for the waiver had ceased." The government then moved to dismiss
the appeal as moot.69
Judge Ginsburg broadly applied the test of "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" to find an exception to the mootness doctrine in Doe's case.70
56 See id. at 32.
" See id at 27. The standing doctrine requires a party to have suffered a sufficient injury
so as to present a justiciable controversy to the court. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472
(1982)(articulating a three-part test for standing).
" See Spann, 899 F.2d at 27-31.
59 See id. at 28.
60 Id. at 29.
61 Id. at 30.
62 The mootness doctrine renders a claim non-justiciable if the action complained of by the
claimant is no longer causing injury. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
63 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.34, 312.35.
See Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1371-75.
6 See id. at 1374.
67 See id. at 1375.
See id.
69 See id.
70 Id. at 1376 (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)(per curiam)).
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Doe's appeal satisfied the evading review standard, Ginsburg wrote, because
the consent waiver granted by the FDA was withdrawn after only three
months, which was not enough time for Doe to secure judicial review.7'
Moreover, Judge Ginsburg noted that the threat of chemical warfare was
ongoing.' Since the regulation was still in place, the controversy was capable
of repetition.73 The plaintiffs had not lost a "personal stake" in the case nor
had the public or the military service personnel lost an interest in the issue.74
Judge Ginsburg's judicial opinions in Center for Nuclear Responsibility,
Spann, and Sullivan highlight her receptivity to arguments favoring litigant
access to the courts. At a minimum, her writings in these opinions demon-
strate her aversion to applying procedural requirements rigidly to preclude
aggrieved litigants from presenting their claims before a court.
B. Court Efficiency
Justice Ginsburg's opinions also evince concerns for court efficiency. As
a federal judge, Justice Ginsburg expressed worry about the pressures of
overloaded federal court dockets:
[The federal courts] have too much business. Some of it must be trimmed if the
quality of federal justice is to remain high, retaining as its hallmark the
individual effort of each judge to make each decision on the justiciability or
merits of a controversy the product of his or her own careful deliberation.75
As a Supreme Court justice, Justice Ginsburg expressed similar concerns,
as reflected in her opinion in Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis.76 In Caterpillar, a
Kentucky resident, Lewis, brought a products liability action in state court
against a nonresident manufacturer, Caterpillar, and an in-state service
company.77 The service company's insurer, also a Kentucky corporation,
intervened as a plaintiff asserting subrogation claims against Caterpillar and
the servicer. 7' After learning that Lewis had settled his claims against the
servicer, Caterpillar removed the remaining claims to federal court on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction.79 Lewis unsuccessfully moved to remand on the
ground that the servicer's continued presence in the suit as a party to the
71 See id.
72 See id. at 1378-79.
71 See id. at 1376-79.
74 See id. at 1378.
7' Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload
of Federal Judges, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983).
76 519 U.S. 61 (1996).
77 See id. at 64-65.
71 See id. at 65.
79 See id.
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subrogation claim rendered diversity incomplete." Before trial, the servicer
was dismissed from the suit, leaving Caterpillar the sole defendant."
After a trial resulting in a verdict for Caterpillar,82 Lewis appealed. 3 The
Sixth Circuit accepted Lewis' argument that the parties were not completely
diverse at the time of removal." Since the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction at the time of removal, the Sixth Circuit vacated the district
court's judgment.8 5
The Supreme Court agreed that the nondiverse service company destroyed
diversity jurisdiction at the time of removal. The Court nevertheless held that
the district court had jurisdiction at the time of judgment and that this was
sufficient to sustain the judgment.8 6 Writing for a unanimous Court,8 7 Justice
Ginsburg implicitly rejected the general rule that subject matter jurisdiction
is assessed at the time of case filing8 and joinder of parties and claims.89
"Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court," she wrote, "consider-
ations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming."'  No
jurisdictional defect existed when the district court rendered its judgment.9'
Dismissing the case after it had been litigated for years "would impose
unnecessary and wasteful burdens on the parties, judges, and other litigants
waiting for judicial attention."'  Since vacating the district court's judgment
"would impose an exorbitant cost on [the] dual court system, a cost incompati-
ble with the fair and unprotracted administration of justice," the Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit's decision reinstating the verdict.93
Similar concerns for court efficiency resonated in Justice Ginsburg's
decision in In re Korean Airlines Disaster of September 1, 1983. 9" A number
of federal court cases arising from the crash of an airliner were consolidated
'0 See id. at 65-66.
" See id. at 66.
82 See id. at 67.
13 See iL
u See id.
8 See id.
86 See id. at 73.
87 See id. at 63.
" See, e.g., Navarro Say. Ass'n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 459 n.1 (1980)(citation omitted)
(observing that jurisdiction turns on the facts existing at the commencement of the suit).
89 See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495, 502 (9th Cir. 1966)(holding that diversity is
determined at the time the complaint is filed, and in the case of an amended complaint joining
new parties, diversity must exist at the time of amendment).
90 Caterpillar, 519 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted).
9' See id. at 77.
92 Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-
Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 836 (1989)).
9' Id. at 77.
94 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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and transferred into a single court for pretrial proceedings. The plaintiffs in
these cases argued that the law of the transferor forum applied to their
claims.95 Judge Ginsburg, then a Circuit Judge on the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, rejected their argument.9 She noted that efficiency was
the dominant concern of the consolidation device, and that "[aipplying
divergent interpretations of the governing federal law to plaintiffs, depending
solely upon where they initially filed suit, would surely reduce the efficiencies
achievable through consolidated preparatory proceedings."97
C. Judicial Integrity
Justice Ginsburg's writings, both as a scholar and as a jurist, provide insight
into her views on the relationships between different actors in the judicial
system, between the judiciary and other political branches, and between
substance and procedure.98 Maintaining the integrity of judicial institutions
appears to be a theme that pervades her thoughts on the interaction among
judges, the judiciary, lawyers, and litigants. Justice Ginsburg's commentary
on four qualities that describe good judges and judging--deference to
precedent, collegiality, judicial interdependence, and procedural accountabil-
ity-point to the notion that the judiciary's legitimacy depends upon
developing careful, balanced relationships between the numerous actors and
institutions in the judicial system.
1. Stare decisis
As an advocate and a jurist, Justice Ginsburg recognized the significance
of precedent. Her experiences in gender discrimination litigation illustrate her
approach to stare decisis. As the director of the American Civil Liberties
Union Women's Rights Project, Ginsburg followed the legal stratagem of
litigating cases that were "clear winners." In a political environment not yet
9' See id. at 1172.
96 See id. at 1175.
97 id.
98 A non-exhaustive list of writings in which Ginsburg expresses her thoughts on
relationships between judicial actors include Ruth Bader Ginsburg, On Muteness, Confidence,
and Collegiality: A Response to Professor Nagel, 61 U. CowO. L. REv. 715 (1990); Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L REv. 133 (1990)[hereinafter Ginsburg,
Remarks]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185
(1992)[hereinafter Ginsburg, Judicial Voice]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Styles of Collegial Judging,
39 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 199 (1992).
" See Deborah L. Markowitz, In Pursuit of Equality: One Woman's Work to Change the
Law, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 335, 337 (1992).
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hospitable to gender claims, her aim was to validate gender discrimination
law, and to establish precedent for more complex cases.
That strategy included advocacy of gender discrimination claims brought
by men." The Supreme Court, many thought, would be more receptive to
striking down laws that unfairly disadvantaged men. The strategy succeeded
in constructing a doctrinal edifice for gender discrimination that later
benefited women. 11 The framing of this incremental litigation strategy lay in
the building of "precedents one upon the other."' 2 Doctrinal change
favorable to women claimants was made easier by a line of gender discrimina-
tion precedents.'0 3
Justice Ginsburg carried her views on stare decisis to the bench. When
questioned in her Senate confirmation hearing on how she would vote on
controversial issues, she replied that she would be "scrupulous in applying the
law on the basis of the Constitution, legislation, and precedent.""' 4 Explaining
her awareness of the reliance interests connected to statutory interpretation,
she said:
The soundness of the reasoning is certainly a consideration. But we shouldn't
abandon a precedent just because we think a different solution more rational.
Justice Brandeis said some things are better settled than settled right, especially
when the legislature sits. So if a precedent settles the construction of a statute,
stare decisis means more than attachment, to the soundness of the reasoning.
Reliance interests are important; the stability, certainty, predictability of the law
is important.'
t See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)(rejecting a federal statute
requiring the husband of a military servicewoman to prove "dependent" status in order to obtain
benefits); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974)(upholding a state statute allowing widows but
not widowers an exemption from small property taxes); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975)(holding unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act giving benefits to
surviving women of a deceased wage earner but not to surviving men); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976)(striking down a state statute prohibiting the sale of beer to males under 21 and to
females under 18); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977)(upholding a state statute allowing
women to exclude more low-earning years than men in calculating Social Security retirement
benefits).
01 The Supreme Court finally applied the intermediate level scrutiny standard to gender-
based classifications in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), an argument Ginsburg made in
her brief to the Court in that case. The Court would not likely have established the intermediate
scrutiny test in Boren were it not for Ginsburg's litigation efforts in prior cases. See Markowitz,
supra note 99, at 356.
,'2 Markowitz, supra note 99, at 345.
103 id.
'04 Hearings, supra note 2, at 192.
"05 Id. at 197 (emphasis added).
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Justice Ginsburg's statement reveals her belief that maintenance of stability,
certainty, and predictability in the legal system justifies close adherence to the
dictates of stare decisis.
Justice Ginsburg's judicial record is consistent with her stated respect for
stare decisis. She is reluctant to deviate from prior case holdings,"° even
when she believes the established rule is not entirely correct.'0 7 Her concur-
rence in United States Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority"~ exemplifies her willingness to support a decision dictated by
precedent even though it is inconsistent with her sense of an appropriate
outcome. In Federal Labor Relations Authority, two local unions filed unfair
labor practice charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA")
after federal agencies refused to comply with the unions' request for the home
addresses of the agency employees in the bargaining units." 9 The agencies
argued that the Privacy Act of 197410 prohibited disclosure."' Rejecting that
contention, the FLRA concluded that the Federal Service Labor-Management
Relations Statute"' required the agencies to disclose the addresses." 3
The Fifth Circuit ordered enforcement of the FLRA's orders, finding that
the requests for disclosure fell within an exception to the Privacy Act-the
Act does not preclude disclosure of personal information that must be
divulged under section 552 of the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA")."14
In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit balanced the public interest in
effective collective bargaining against the employees' interest in keeping their
home addresses private."'
'o See, e.g., Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 975 F.2d 871
(D.C. Cir. 1992)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(arguing against the redefinition of the test of "con-
fidentiality" under the Freedom of Information Act established in National Parks and Conser-
vation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974), because "stare decisis is a wise policy").
107 See, e.g., Save Our Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 826 F.2d 43 (D.C. Cir.
1987)(Ginsburg, J., concurring)(questioning the lodestar rule established in a prior case decided
in the Circuit but refusing to circumvent the rule because it was precedent).
'0s 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
',9 See id. at 490.
"o 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988 & Supp. IV).
.. See Federal Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. at 490 [hereinafter FLRA].
112 5 U.S.C. § 7101-7135 (1988 & Supp. IV) [hereinafter labor statute].
,3 See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 490.
114 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV) [hereinafter FOIA]; see FLRA, 510 U.S. at 491.
The only exception to FOIA disclosure that potentially applied, the provision exempting
personnel files "the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV), did not bar disclosure in this case.
See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 491.
,S See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 491. Application of this test appeared to run contrary to the
Supreme Court's holding in Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom Press,
489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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The Supreme Court reversed, finding that disclosure of the addresses would
contravene the Privacy Act."6  In Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committee for Freedom Press, the Court specified that the only public interest
to be considered under FOIA is "the extent to which disclosure would serve
the 'core purpose of the FOIA,' which is 'contribut[ing] significantly to public
understanding of the operations or activities of the government.""' 7 The fact
that FOIA's provisions were implicated indirectly under the Labor Statute did
not mean that the FOIA analysis should incorporate the policies underlying the
Labor Statute."' Guided by Reporter's Committee, the majority found the
public interest in disclosure of the addresses negligible, as disclosure "would
not appreciably further 'the citizens' right to be informed about what their
government is up to.""' 9
Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's analysis. 20 She noted that
Congress intended to bolster the position of federal unions by enacting the
labor statute.' Thus, Congress did not intend to deny federal unions
information that private-sector unions routinely received." Moreover,
Congress could not have aimed to elevate the privacy interest above the
interest in promoting the collective bargaining endeavors of federal unions.'23
Based on this, Justice Ginsburg argued that Reporter's Committee did not
necessitate the majority's interpretation of FOIA.
Notwithstanding her disagreement with the majority, Justice Ginsburg
concurred with the judgment of the Court. She wrote, "I am mindful,
however, that the preservation of Reporter's Committee, unmodified, is the
position solidly approved by my colleagues, and I am also mindful that the
pull of precedent is strongest in statutory cases."' 25 She therefore concluded
that the anomaly resulting from the Court's decision-that federal unions are
denied information accessible to private-sector unions-should be rectified
not by the Court but by Congress. 26
116 See FLRA, 510 U.S. at 489.
"' Id. at 495 (quoting Reporter's Committee, 489 U.S. at 775 (alteration in original)).
"g See id. at 498-99.
119 Id. at 497 (quoting Reporter's Committee, 489 U.S. at 773).
'~ See id. at 504 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
1 See id at 506 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
' See id.
' See id
124 See id.
"2 Id. at 509 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
126 See id.
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2. Collegiality
Described as a "judge's judge,"'2 7 Justice Ginsburg has emphasized
collegiality in judges' relationships with each other. 8 In their writings,
judges should adopt a "judicial voice," one that pays heed to the impact of
their expressions on the public's respect for the court. 9 As administrators of
"the least dangerous" branch of government," 0 judges "hold neither the sword
nor the purse of the community," and must give effect to their judgments
through persuasion.'31 Judges should therefore write in a "moderate and
restrained voice" that reflects temperance in judgment.'
In keeping with a collegial judging style, judges should exercise restraint
in writing separately.' "[Olverindulgence in separate opinion writing,"
Ginsburg has warned, "may undermine both the reputation of the judiciary for
judgment and the respect accorded court dispositions."'' " When judges
endeavor to write separately, they should "engag[e] in a dialogue with, not a
diatribe against, co-equal departments of government, state authorities, and
even [their] own colleagues.'"35 Separate opinions should not "generate more
heat than light" '36 by way of "intemperate denunciation of [the writer's]
colleagues, violent invective, attributi[on]s of bad motives to the majority of
the court, and insinuations of incompetence, negligence, prejudice, or
obtuseness of [other judges]."'37  Rather, an appropriate separate opinion
articulates independent legal reasons for the author's decision and points out
differences with the opinions of other members of the court without undermin-
ing public confidence in the judiciary. 38
Restraint in writing separately is conducive to respectful relationships
among judges. Ginsburg's writings express her belief that adherence to a
127 Peter W. Huber & Richard Taranto, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Judge's Judge, WALL ST.
J., June 15, 1993, at AI8; Sheila M. Smith, Comment, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sexual
Harassment Law: Will the Second Female Supreme Court Justice Become the Court's
Women's Rights Champion?, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1893, 1897 (1995).
" See generally Remarks, supra note 98; see also Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1190-
91.
'2 Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1190-91.
13o THE FEDERALST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
131 Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1186.
132 Id. (quoting Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
754, 757 (1963)).
3 See id. at 1194-96.
134 Id.
131 Id. at 1186.
136 Id. at 1194.
131 Id. (quoting Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39
A.B.A. J. 794, 795 (1953))(alterations in original).
131 See id. at 1196.
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collegial style enables the "steady, upright, and impartial administration of the
laws."'39 The operation of the courts is helped by collegial relationships
because it fosters good-will among members of a court, and in turn, validates
the judiciary in the public's estimation. 4 °
3. Measured movement
Justice Ginsburg's academic writings offer commentary on how the
judiciary should coordinate with other political branches. Justice Ginsburg
regards the judicial system as "an interdependent part" of America's
democratic system. 4' The office of the judiciary is to formulate legal
doctrine-but in doing so, courts should engage in dialogue with other
branches of government and also with the populace. 42 Judges can legislate,
but "'only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular
motions.'""43 In her words, courts will do well to make "measured movement"
in crafting legal doctrine.'" At her Senate confirmation hearing, Justice
Ginsburg quoted Justice Benjamin Cardozo to clarify what it means to make
measured movement in adjudication: "Justice is not to be taken by storm.
She is to be wooed by slow advances."' 45 Judges should render decisions with
deliberateness, making sure that their rulings are well-reasoned, supported by
precedent, and limited in their stride.'" "Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped,"
she admonishes, "may prove unstable." 47
Justice Ginsburg cited Roe v. Wade" as an example of improvident judicial
decisionmaking. She criticized the Roe Court for not engaging in a dialogue
with legislators in formulating its holding.'49 At the time Roe was decided,
state legislatures across the nation were prepared to liberalize abortion
139 Id. at 1188 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465 (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961)).
'40 Seeid. at 1191.
141 Id. at 1198.
142 See id.
143 Id. (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Ginsburg's view of the proper role of the courts is echoed by Legal Process
theorists. Legal Process scholars argue that courts should fashion legal rules according to a
legitimate set of procedures, but they should defer to the legislature as the primary lawmaking
branch. See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL L. REv. 465, 505 (1988)
(reviewing LAURA KALImAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
'4 See Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1198.
145 Hearings, supra note 2, at 51.
'" See Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1208.
147 Id. at 1198.
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149 See Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1205.
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statutes.'" In her view, the Court took the abortion issue away from
legislators and instituted its own system of regulation.' Roe left virtually no
state abortion laws standing.'52 Roe was, in short, not a measured move-
ment-it was a quantum leap."'
Decisions such as Roe, Justice Ginsburg argued, threaten to undermine the
legitimacy of the court as the "final arbiter of constitutional questions[.]""' 4
The Court's adoption of "[t]wo extreme modes of court intervention in social
change processes... place[s] stress on the institution."' 55 At times, the Court
is the vanguard of social change; at other times, the Court is a resistor of
change.5 6 In adopting either stance, Ginsburg observed, the Court has earned
the labels "activist" or "imperial," and has weakened its credibility.'57 Courts
can, and should, "reinforce or signal a green light for a social change," but
"without taking giant strides and thereby risking a backlash too forceful to
contain."' 8 Justice Ginsburg thus concluded that a temperate approach to
judicial decisionmaking is true to the role of the judiciary within the American
scheme of governmental power.
4. Procedural accountability
A former law clerk to Justice Ginsburg described her penchant for methods
and procedures as "almost [a] Talmudic reverence and respect for the process
of law... .'"59 Although perhaps overstated, this assessment points to Justice
Ginsburg's careful use of procedure to assure appropriate airing of legal
controversies. Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona6° is illustrative.
The plaintiff in Arizonans, Maria-Kelly F. Yniguez, was an Arizona state
employee at the time she sued the State challenging the constitutionality of a
'50 See id. at 1205.
151 See id.
152 See i&l
153 See id.
'54 Id. at 1206.
"55 Id. at 1205-06.
516 See id. at 1206.
157 See id.
"a Id. at 1208.
159 Jeffrey Rosen, The New Look of Liberalism on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1997, §
6 (Magazine), at 90. Peter Huber, the law clerk who made the comment, also noted, "[I]t is an
extremely revealing fact about Ruth Ginsburg that she taught civil procedure for 17 years[.] ...
She has this terribly old-fashioned notion that rules can get written down or can evolve through
a common-law process and can build upon each other to create a decisional fabric." Id. at 86,
90 (internal quotation marks omitted).
160 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
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provision of the Arizona State Constitution. 6' Yniguez alleged that Article
XXVIH of the Arizona State Constitution, which declared English as "the
official language of the State" and required the State to "act in English and in
no other language,"' 62 violated the First Amendment.'63 Yniguez feared she
would lose her job or face other sanctions if she spoke in Spanish in the
course of her employment."6 The district court found Article XXVIII fatally
overbroad.' 65
Following judgment, the Attorney General, the Arizonans for Official
English Committee ("AOE") and its chairman, Robert D. Park, moved to
intervene as defendants to appeal the court's invalidation of Article XXVII.' 66
The court denied the motions to intervene, 67 and the Attorney General, AOE
and Park appealed to the Ninth Circuit."6 Meanwhile, Yniguez resigned from
her state employment, whereupon the Attorney General informed the Ninth
Circuit that the case may have become moot." 9 The Ninth Circuit rejected the
suggestion of mootness, pointing out that Yniguez may be entitled to nominal
damages."' 0 Later, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed its panel's
conclusion that the provision was overbroad.'
The Supreme Court held that the case was moot. Justice Ginsburg, writing
for a unanimous Court, posed the question: "Is this conflict really necess-
ary?"' 72  She found the actual controversy extinguished when Yniguez
resigned herjob.'73 The litigation, however important, was being pursued by
groups on behalf of a nonexistent plaintiff. According to Justice Ginsburg, the
federal courts should have stopped its adjudication of the state constitutional
provision when Yniguez left her job.'74 The Court's vacation of the Ninth
161 See id. at 48.
'62 ARIZ. CONST. art. XXVmI (1988).
'6 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2; see Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 50.
'6 See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 50.
' See id. at 54; see also Yniguez v. Mofford, 730 F. Supp. 309 (D. Ariz. 1990).
'" See Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 55-56. Governor Mofford, a defendant in the action,
announced that she would not appeal the district court's order. See id. at 56.
26" See id The district court found that the Attorney General, as an organ of the state, was
already a party to the action. See id) at 56-67. Therefore, it could not intervene. See id.
Further, the Attorney General was estopped from appealing because of Governor Mofford's
decision to forego an appeal. See id. at 57.
'" See id. at 57.
'69 See id. at 59-60.
270 See id. at 60.
17 See id. at 63; see Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official English, 69 F.3d 920, 931-48 (9th
Cir. 1995)(en banc).
272 Arizonans, 520 U.S. at 75.
13 See id. at 67.
274 See id. at 68. Additionally, the Court held that the Ninth Circuit erred in declaring that
she was entitled to nominal damages because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 created no remedy against a
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Circuit decision, she noted, did not preclude legal challenges to Article
XXVII. At the time of the Yniguez decision, a constitutional challenge to the
amendment was percolating through the Arizona state courts.
175
Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Agostini v. Felton176 similarly evidences her
insistence on procedural propriety-or more specifically, her objection to the
twisting of procedural rules to accomplish substantive ends. Agostini revisited
Aguilar v. Felton,17 7 in which the Court had held that the Establishment
Clause 78 barred the New York City Board of Education from maintaining a
program that sent public school teachers into parochial schools to teach
disadvantaged children. 79  The district court permanently enjoined the
Board's program on remand. 80 Ten years after Aguilar, the Board sought
relief from the injunction pursuant to FRCP 60(b),' arguing that the
"decisional law [had] changed to make legal what the [injunction] was
designed to prevent."' 2 Determining that its more recent Establishment
Clause cases undermined the assumptions upon which Aguilar relied, 183 the
Court reopened the judgment under FRCP 60(b)(5) and dissolved the
injunction. 4
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the majority's use of FRCP
60(b) and Supreme Court Rule 44185 to overturn the original Aguilar decision.
State. See id. at 69.
175 See Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Comment, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes:
Yniguez and the Racialization of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REv. 221, 222 (1997).
176 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
'77 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
179 U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
'v See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402.
'8 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 212.
181 FRCP 60(b) provides, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which
it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b).
112 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 214 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,
388 (1992)).
183 See id. at 222.
's4 See id. at 240.
a Supreme Court Rule 44 states in pertinent part:
1. Any petition for the rehearing of any judgment or decision of the Court on the merits
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If the Court applied the Court's Rules and FRCP 60(b) properly, she reasoned,
it would have deferred reconsideration of Aguilar until it was presented with
the issue in another case.8 6 The Board's petition for reconsideration in
Agostini did not comport with Supreme Court Rule 44, which provides that
such petitions be filed within 25 days of the entry of the judgment in
question. 7
According to Justice Ginsburg, the Court saw no "better [procedural]
vehicle" 18 8 to reconsider Aguilar directly, so it tortuously employed FRCP
60(b)(5) as a "substitute." ' 9  However, she opined, "[tihere are such
[procedural] vehicles in motion, and the Court does not say otherwise."'"
Rule 60(b)(5) does not permit relitigation of legal or factual claims underlying
the original judgment.' 9 ' It allows modification of the injunction only if the
facts or the law had changed so much as to warrant such relief,"9 and this case
did not satisfy those requirements.'93 In her estimation, the Court had "just
cause" to wait for another case that appropriately invited review of Aguilar.'94
"That cause," she explained, "lies in the maintenance of integrity in the
interpretation of procedural rules, [and] preservation of the responsive, non-
agenda-setting character of this Court[.]"' 95
This survey of Justice Ginsburg's writings on legal process and procedure
suggests that her judging style endeavors to accommodate numerous
considerations. These considerations include affording litigants the opportu-
nity to resolve their grievances in the courts; ensuring the efficient operation
of the courts; and maintaining working relationships among participants
within the legal system as well as between the judiciary and the other political
branches and the public.
shall be filed within 25 days after entry of the judgment or decision, unless the Court or
a Justice shortens or extends the time.
Sup. Cr. R. 44.
1" See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 255 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
187 See id.
,g Id. at 259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting majority
opinion, 521 U.S. at 239).
18 Id. at 255 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
I90 ld. at 259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
'9' See id. at 257 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192 See id.
'9' See id. at 257-58. Justice Ginsburg focused on whether the district court abused its
discretion when it concluded that the facts and the law had not changed to such an extent as to
warrant relief from the injunction. See id. at 257. Since Aguilar had not been overruled, and
the factual situation had not changed, she concluded that the district court was correct in
denying the petition for relief under FRCP 60(b). See id. at 257-58.
"9 Id. at 260 (Ginsburg,.J., dissenting).
195 Id.
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Identifying general themes in Justice Ginsburg's legal thought is one task.
A much more difficult one is ascertaining their complex interplay in Justice
Ginsburg's decisionmaking. To aid in our assessment of that interplay, we
describe here, and employ later, a broad framework of process values.
Im[. PROCESS VALUES FRAMEWORK
This Part outlines a framework for assessing Justice Ginsburg's process and
procedural jurisprudence. Process values are "the goals and positive
contributions of good procedure[.I"' The framework we construct consists
of three process values--efficiency, fairness and institutional legitimacy.
Briefly stated, efficiency in the context of judicial process refers to the
minimization of costs to courts and litigants.1 97 Fairness may be equated with
the opportunity to participate meaningfully in proceedings that affect one's
legal interests.'98 Finally, institutional legitimacy denotes the public's
acceptance of the judiciary as the public institution for adjudicating legal
disputes.' 99
As described earlier, these values are comprised of several more discrete
concepts. Additionally, efficiency, fairness, and institutional legitimacy are
not neatly separable. They are often in tension, sometimes overlapping or
colliding. It is this tension, as procedures are construed and applied in
particular situations, that creates a process dynamic helpful to our understand-
ing of Justice Ginsburg's approach to judging.
A. Efficiency
The term "efficiency" in law generally refers to the value of minimizing the
costs of fair and accurate judicial administration. °' Legal efficiency is
'96 John R. Allison, Ideology, Prejudgment, and Process Values, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 657,
659 (1994).
"' See Stephen G. Bullock & Linda Rose Gallagher, Surveying the State of the Mediative
Art: A Guide to Institutionalizing Mediation in Louisiana, 57 LA. L REV. 885, 917-18 (1997).
198 See Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461,483 n.24 (1982)("What a full and
fair opportunity to litigate entails is the procedural requirements of due process.").
'" See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43
DuKE L.J. 703,714 (1994). There are differing views on the source of institutional legitimacy.
See Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative, and Cognitive Perspectives
in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 475,493 (1997)(examining different
theories of the source of legal legitimacy).
20o Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing Complex
Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LrrIG. 273, 277 (1991). The distinction should be made between
efficiency for individual litigants and systemic efficiency. See id at 277-78. Securing the "just,
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achieved by streamlining the judicial system through the reduction of overall
cost and delay."' Two theories of systemic efficiency have gained acceptance
in legal discourse. The first is utilitarianism, a long-established conception of
the aggregate good developed by social philosophers Jeremy Bentham20 2 and
John Stuart Mill.203 The principle tenet of utilitarianism is the achievement
of the greatest good for the greatest number.2' Maximization of social
welfare is the central aim of utility theory. The utilitarian measures the
relationship between every cost and every benefit in order obtain the
maximum benefits at the minimum cost possible.2 5
In the context of judicial procedure, utilitarianism holds that litigation is
efficient when it maximizes outcome accuracy.6 The Supreme Court adopted
such a view of procedural due process in Mathews v. Eldridge.'m The purpose
of procedure, the Court explained, is the accurate application of substantive
speedy, and inexpensive" adjudication of a claim for an individual litigant is the focus of
individual efficiency. See id. at 278. By contrast, systemic efficiency perspective is
preoccupied with benefits to the judicial system as a whole. See id. That which makes the
administration of courts efficient, however, does not necessarily inure to the benefit of an
individual litigant. See id For instance, a court's decision to consolidate several pending trials
that arise from the same transaction conserves the court's resources and time. See id. At the
same time, consolidation could prolong or complicate the process by which an individual
litigant secures compensation. See id.
201 See id.
202 See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 1-7 (Clarendon Press 1907)(1823).
203 See generally JOHN STUART MI.L, UTILIrARIANISM (Oskar Priest ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc. 1957)(1863).
204 See Bentham, supra note 202, at 1-7.
25 See Brunet, supra note 200, at 279. Utility theory is predominantly concerned with the
aggregate benefits to society as a whole, rather than benefits to individuals. See R. MALLOY,
LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 40 (1990).
206 See Brunet, supra note 200, at 280.
- 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The plaintiff in Mathews, who was allegedly disabled, challenged
the administrative procedure of the Social Security Administration, arguing that his Social
Security disability benefits could be terminated only after his disability status was determined
at an evidentiary hearing before a hearing examiner. See id. at 324-25. The Supreme Court
ruled that an evidentiary hearing was not required prior to the termination of his benefits. See
id. at 349. The Court set out the following analytical framework for determining whether
process is due:
[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that additional or substitute procedural requisites would entail.
Id. at 335.
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law at reasonable costs,"' which in turn benefits society at large. 9 A
procedure that does not enhance accuracy is inefficient by definition, even if
it is cheap or serves some other purpose such as affording a litigant the
opportunity to be heard.2"
A second theory of efficiency emerges from law and economics, a school
of legal thought introduced in the 1960s.2 ' Efficiency is its central norm.2 '
Law and economics conceives of efficiency as value-maximization. 21a It
translates utility theory's goal of promoting general social welfare into
quantitative terms.1 4
Under a law and economics view of the judicial system, the goal of judicial
procedure is to minimize "error costs" and "direct costs. 21 5  Error costs
accrue when the judicial system makes an inaccurate determination, such as
when it mistakenly imposes legal liability on a party.21 6 Direct costs are
incurred in connection with the administration of the judicial system.21 7
Ideally, parties to a dispute avoid these costs by agreeing to settle their
differences outside of the court system in a manner that serves their best
economic interests.2" Law economics, then, measures the efficiency of legal
... See id. at 334.
209 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 354 (1990). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Ci. L. REV. 28 (1976).
20 See Yamamoto, supra note 209, at 354.
211 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
21 See Russell Hardin, Magic on the Frontier: The Norm of Efficiency, U. PA. L. REV.
1987, 1987 (1996). Law and economics scholars, however, recognize multiple definitions of
"efficiency." See Gregory S. Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics Movement:
Confronting the Problems of Nonfalsiflability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
231,234 (1991). One conception of efficiency is "Pareto" efficiency, which holds that a system
is efficient "if it operates to benefit at least one person and harms no one, with the persons
affected being the judges of whether benefits or harms have resulted." Id. at 234-35. Law and
economics also recognizes "Kaldor-Hicks" efficiency. See id. Under this definition, a rule is
said to enhance efficiency if its total benefits exceed its total costs. See id. at 236.
213 See RiCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs oF LAw, 10 (1977) [hereinafter Posner,
Economic Analysis] ("'Efficiency' means exploiting economic resources in such a way that
'value'--human satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods
and services-is maximized.").
214 See RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICs OF JusrIcE 49 (1981).
215 See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial
Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399, 400-01 (1973)[hereinafter Posner, Economic Approach];
Posner, Economic Analysis, supra note 213, at 430.
216 See Posner, Economic Approach, supra note 215, at 400-01.
217 See id. at 401.
2. See Bryant G. Garth, Privatization and New Formalism: Making the Courts Safe for
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rules by their ability to replicate this process, incurring the "least expense
necessary to achieve accurate determinations."2 9
B. Fairness
Procedural fairness is prominent in the process values framework for two
reasons. First, concerns of adjudicatory fairness often counterbalance con-
siderations of efficiency.220 Second, procedural fairness, which is easier to
achieve than substantive fairness, 221 tends to serve as the marker for the
overall fairness of adjudication.' No single concept encompasses the many
values comprising adjudicatory fairness." 3 In the context of litigation,
procedural fairness may be viewed in three component parts: litigant
autonomy, dignity, and participation.
Litigant autonomy reflects the notion that a party is entitled to exercise
control over her own litigation."' The party is presumed to retain authorityto make all relevant decisions with respect to the prosecution of her claim or
Bureaucracy, 1988 LAW & SOC. INQ. 157, 161.
219 See Michael D. Bayles, Principles for Legal Procedure, 5 LAW & PHIL 37, 45
(1986)(explaining that the principle of economic costs is to minimize the economic costs of
legal procedures).
220 See Brunet, supra note 200, at 276 (noting that a "tension between efficiency and fairness
clearly exists," but that the tension cannot be defined in simple terms). Pursuit of efficiency
conflicts with fairness at times, which is why the fairness-efficiency tension often surfaces in
matters of judicial procedure. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Thomas E. Baker, A Self Study of
Federal Judicial Rulemaking-A Report from the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to
the Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, 168 F.R.D. 679, 692-93 (1996)(observing that the command of FRCP 1 that the Rules
"shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action" points to the "inevitable tension" between fairness and efficiency). It is thus
important to consider the concerns of fairness alongside our discussion of efficiency.
2' See Allison, supra note 196, at 678.
m See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OFPROCEDURAL JUSTICE
209 (1988); see also Allison, supra note 196, at 678. Procedural justice is a dimension of John
Rawl's theory of distributive justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (1971).
The fairness of an outcome depends not just on whether it is objectively fair, but also on
whether it is subjectively perceived as fair. See Laurens Walter et al., The Relation Between
Procedural and Distributive Justice, 65 VA. L REV. 1401, 1402-03 (1979). Rawls argues that
"pure procedural justice" may serve as a "surrogate for distributive justice" when the substantive
fairness of an outcome cannot be easily ascertained. Allison, supra note 196, at 678; Rawls,
supra, at 83-90.
23 Brunet, supra note 200, at 283.
" See Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class
Actions": An Introduction, 80 CORNELLL. REV. 811, 814 (1995).
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defense,225 including the type of lawsuit filed; 6 the forum in which to litigate
the case;227 the claims and defenses that are raised;228 the resources to be
expended; 229 and the decision to settle or go to trial.23 The American judicial
system has long recognized three reasons for the parties' control over the
litigation.231 First, litigant autonomy is rooted in the philosophical tradition
that recognizes the dignity of the individual.232 Second, individual autonomy
rests upon the economic assumption that the possessor of a legal interest is
best positioned to make decisions about that interest.233 Finally, placing in the
injured party the authority to prosecute claims affects the fairness of the
outcome.234
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See id.
229 See id.
230 See id.; Brunet, supra note 200, at 284 ("Litigant autonomy includes various strategy
choices that we have occasionally labeled 'rights,' including the plaintiffs ability to select a
forum for reasons ranging from geographic preference to choice of law[,] ... the ability to
determine the scope of a case, whether to select a potentially manageable and speedy two-party
suit or to file a potentially complicated class action.").
231 See Roger H. Transgrud, Mass Trials in Mass Tort Cases: A Dissent, 1989 U. ILL L.
REV. 69,75 (1989).
232 Immanuel Kant, for instance, posited that the individual is of intrinsic worth, that being
dignity. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRmQUE OF PURE REASON AND OTHER WORKS ON THE THEORY
OFETHICs 46-54 (Thomas Kingsmill Abbott ed. & trans., Longmans, Green, and Co. Ltd. 6th
ed. 1927)(1785). Kant reasoned that the basis of human dignity is autonomy. See id. at 54. It
follows that an injured individual is entitled to retain control over the process by which he or
she seeks redress, for injury to the person as well as to personal dignity, from the alleged
tortfeasor. See Transgrud, supra note 231, at 74.
233 See Transgrud, supra note 231, at 74. Decisions involving the disposition of a personal
injury claim, for example, should be left to the litigant. See id. Professor Transgrud explains:
Control and disposition of a valuable piece of property, such as a substantial tort claim,
ought to rest with its owner, the injured party or his family, and not with some stranger
such as a class representative or lead counsel in a mass tort case consolidated in a
common venue.
Id. The litigant is more likely to control the claim in a way that maximizes personal satisfaction,
be it by trial, settlement, or alternative means of resolution. See id.
234 See id. at 83. A person who is permitted to litigate a tort claim on behalf of the injured
party without that party's substantial input may engage in harassment, deception, and other
misconduct to win the claim. See id. The Agent Orange litigation provides an example of
plaintiffs' lawyers engaging in questionable tactics to retain or secure control of the litigation.
See id A classic example is that of an attorney who solicits clients in mass tort cases for a class
action suit without first explaining to them the implications of maintaining the suit as a class
action. See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Pro-
ducts, Inc., 80 CORNaEL L. REV. 1045, 1137-42 (1995)(describing the account of a couple who
was led by attorneys to think that their only way to secure compensation for the husband's
mesothelioma was to agree to be named representatives in a class action). In such instances of
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The second component, dignity, is associated with the concern for the
humiliation or loss of self-respect a person experiences when she is precluded
from litigating.'3 5 Dignity includes "the right to receive a careful, measured,
and respectful consideration of a litigant's participation." '36 Closely related
to the concept of dignity is the value of participation, or the appreciation of
litigation as a way to express one's will in societal decisions of concern to
oneself.237 In tandem, dignity and participation values reflect the norm that
"[p]rocedures should be designed to make affected parties feel that they
matter., 238 Empirical studies confirm that judicial processes that respect the
parties' dignity and participation interests enhance perceptions of adjudicatory
fairness.239
Respect for individual dignity is important additionally because it is
conducive to a functional society.2' The legitimacy of the judicial system
rests on more than substantive outcomes.24' Procedures that allow those
overzealous representation, the substantial attorney's fees at stake are more the driving force
behind the litigation than the aim of securing corrective justice and compensation for the injured
party. See Transgrud, supra note 231, at 75.
23" See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to
Protect One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153, 1172 (1973).
236 Brunet, supra note 200, at 283. See generally Mashaw, supra note 209, at 49-52
(discussing the dignitary theory of procedural due process); Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative
Due Process: The Quest For a Dignitary Theory, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981)(pointing out the
merits of a dignitary theory of administrative due process). A Rand Institute study found that
litigants rated dignity as the highest of procedural values. See E. ALLAN LIND ET AL, THE
PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES 70 (1989).
237 See Michelman, supra note 235, at 1172.
"' Allison, supra note 196, at 681.
239 See Lind & Tyler, supra note 222, at 230-40. Lind and Tyler's studies demonstrate that
litigants perceive procedures that afford them an opportunity to present their evidence and argu-
ments as fairer than procedures that preclude them from being heard in the process. See id. at
215. Fair judicial procedures may enhance the value of dignity independent of the substantive
outcome. See id at 207. Richard Safire describes this sense of well-being derived from fair
procedural treatment as "inherent dignity." Richard Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values:
Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. Rev. 111, 121
(1978).
Furthermore, procedures that allow litigants to participate foster perceptions of fairness
even when the litigant does not have an opportunity to influence the outcome, see Tom R. Tyler,
The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: Implications for Civil Commitment
Hearings, 56 SMU L. REV. 433,439-40 (1992), or when the substantive outcome is unfavorable
to the litigant. See Lind & Tyler, supra note 222, at 215. By contrast, a litigant who is deprived
of the freedom to make critical decisions about the litigation is likely to perceive the litigation
experience as procedurally unfair and arbitrary. See Brunet, supra note 200, at 284; see also
Yamamoto, supra note 209, at 388.
240 See Yamamoto, supra note 209, at 388.
241 See id. at 389.
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affected to participate in decisions pertaining to their interests bolster the
legitimacy of the government.242 However, government processes which are
apathetic or repugnant to dignity concerns cultivate the belief that government
power is nothing but arbitrary and naked coercion.243
The last component of fairness, due process,2A refers to process "which,
following the forms of law, is appropriate to the case, and just to the parties
to be affected. '245 Justice Frankfurter wrote that due process "[r]epresent[s]
a profound attitude of fairness between man and man, and more particularly
between the individual and government ....,,26 The foundation of due
process is the notion that a person should have her rights and liabilities
affected by the state only through a fair process. Paramount to fair process in
American jurisprudence are notice,2 7 adequate representation, 248 and the
opportunity to be heard. 9
C. Institutional Legitimacy
Fairness and efficiency concerns sometimes intersect with the judiciary's
interest in maintaining its legitimacy. Called the "least dangerous branch"'25
because of its lack of coercive power and control over the purse-strings of the
242 See Mashaw, supra note 209, at 49-50.
243 See id.; Yamamoto, supra note 209, at 389.
2" "Due process" in this article refers to procedural due process rather than substantive due
process.
245 Hagar v. Reclamation Dist., No. 108, 111 U.S. 701,708 (1884).
246 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 (195 1)(Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
247 See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In a landmark case which
constitutionalized the requirement of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that a court
cannot exert personal jurisdiction over an individual without first having given notice to that
person. See id.
248 See, e.g., Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). The plaintiffs in Hansberry sought to
enjoin the defendants from breaching a racially-restrictive covenant. See id. at 37-38.
Defendants argued that the agreement was ineffective because the requisite 95% of landowners
had not signed it. See id. at 38. Plaintiffs responded that the issue was res judicata by way of
stipulation to the requisite number of signatories in an earlier suit. See id The lower courts
found in favor of plaintiffs, see id. at 38-39, but on certiorari, the Supreme Court held that
defendants were not adequately represented by the litigants in the previous suit, whose interests
were antagonistic to that of defendants. See id. at 42-46.
249 See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Challenges were made to state statutes
authorizing the issuance of writs of replevin without the requirement of notice to the defendant
or a hearing. See id) at 69-70. The Supreme Court struck down the statutes as violative of the
due process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment, holding that parties whose rights are
to be affected are entitled under procedural due process to be heard at a meaningful time. See
id. at 96-97.
250 Hamilton, supra note 130.
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community,25 the judiciary draws its authority from public acceptance of it
as the institution fit to interpret and apply the law.252 When public perception
of the judiciary's legitimacy decreases, acceptance by the public of institu-
tional decisions similarly decreases.253
Fair judicial process enhances public perceptions of legitimacy" when it
assures that courts do not assume "functions that exceed the appropriate
judicial role.2 5  When courts appear to exceed their powers, to transgress
2" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)(highlighting the importance
of the legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court in light of its lack of coercive power or
ability to provide financial incentives); see also Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The
Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL SC. 635, 635
(1992)(observing that the judiciary lacks the "standard political levers over people and
institutions").
252 See Hamilton, supra note 130; see also Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 707. The
Supreme Court spoke emphatically about the judiciary's dependence on public perceptions of
its legitimacy in Casey, a case in which the Court upheld Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
The Court said:
Our analysis would not be complete, however, without explaining why overruling Roe's
central holding would not only reach an unjustifiable result under principles of stare
decisis, but would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise the judicial power
and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of law. To
understand why this would be so it is necessary to understand the source of this Court's
authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the
country's understanding of itself as a constitutional Republic.
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the instance of
the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the United States and
specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding generation are rightly
told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by spending money and, except to a
minor degree, it cannot independently coerce obedience to its decrees. The Court's power
lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a product of substance and perception that shows itself in the
people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and
to declare what it demands.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 864-65. The Court attributes its legitimacy to principled decisionmaking.
See id at 866. Unless adjudicative outcomes are viewed as principled, the decisions of the court
will be viewed with skepticism by the public. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 199, at 707.
253 See JANE W. ADLER ET AL., SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LrIGANTS FARE iN THE PITrSBURGH
COURT ARBITRATION PROGRAM 90-91 (1983)(detecting a strong link between perceptions of
procedural justice and satisfaction levels, and between satisfaction and acceptance of decisions
in court-annexed arbitration programs).
254 See Allison, supra note 196, at 682; see also Tom R. Tyler & Kenneth R. Rasinski,
Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular U.S. Supreme
Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 621, 626 (1991). Procedural
justice refers to the belief that the procedures by which authorities make decisions are fair. See
id. (surveying the procedural justice literature).
255 Susan P. Sturm, A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies, 78 GEO. L.J. 1355, 1403
(1991). The notion that there is a proper allocation of governmental power is reflected in
considerations of federalism and the limits of equity power. See id. For instance, appellate
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procedural restraints, public perceptions of judicial illegitimacy arise.256 The
public commonly understands that the judiciary's role is to decide cases by
employing legal principles and reasoning.257 When courts deviate from this
role,25 the public fears that the courts are usurping the authority of other
branches of government without the constraints of political accountability.259
A court's effort to influence substantive outcomes may also affect its
legitimacy.' 6° When called upon to decide a case that will have significant
political or social ramifications, a court may apply procedural rules to dispose
of the case without resolving the underlying substantive issues.26' Altema
courts may disapprove of district courts intruding on the discretion of state and local executive
branches. See, e.g., Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 844 (D.C. Cir. 1988)("In this
setting of institutional conditions litigation ... courts work in an arena that represents a
crossroads where the local political branches of government meet the Article III branch and the
higher commands of the Constitution."); Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1145 (5th Cir.)(per
curiam)("As a matter of respect for the state's role and for the allocation of functions in our
federal system... the relief ordered by federal courts must be 'consistent with the policy of
minimum intrusion into the affairs of state prison administration that the Supreme Court has
articulated for the federal courts."' (quoting Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, 571 (5th Cir.),
vacated in part, amended in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1982))).
2"6 See Sturm, supra note 255, at 1403.
27 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPuCATION OFLAW 143-44 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey
eds. 1994) (arguing that courts have an obligation to justify their decisions by "reasoned
elaboration").
25 Hart and Sacks explain that each governmental institution is "institutionally competent"
to address certain types of legal questions. The legislative branch is suited to handle questions
that can be answered by political compromise or majority rule. See id. at 112, 696-97. The
executive branch is most competent to deal with questions that require discretionary decisions
to be made. See id. at 143-44. The judiciary, however, is charged with the responsibility of
formulating general rules that are consistent with precedent and that can be applied to future
cases. See id.
259 See Sturm, supra note 255, at 1406. Criticism of the court for overstepping its bounds
may center on the incapacity of the judicial process, a mechanism tailored to address narrow
factual situations, to remedy broad social problems. See id at 1406-08. Additionally, the public
may perceive the court as compromising the fairness of the process. See id. at 1409.
260 See Michael E. Levine & Charles R. Plott, Agenda Influence iand Its Implications, 63 VA.
L. REV. 561, 563 (1977).
261 Robert Cover cites the example of Robinson v. Smyth, 126 Eng. Rep. 1007 (C.P. 1799),
reprinted in Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the
Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 723 (1975), a case in which the defendant moved to postpone a trial
on an action for wages allegedly due to the plaintiff, a seaman. Defendant's justification was
the absence of one of its witnesses, who was prepared to testify that plaintiff was defendant's
slave. See id. If that fact were to be established, defendant would owe plaintiff no wages. See
id. The court denied the procedural motion, thereby assuring victory for the plaintiff. See id.
It remarked that the substantive defense was "odious" and that although recognized by law, a
court "should not give [it] a day's time." Id. Cover submits that the case is troubling, not
because the court disfavored the slavery defense, but because it manipulated the process to
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tively, procedure is a means by which the court can recast substantive issues
in a different, and less controversial, light.262 In either event, the public may
detect that the court has not addressed the issue candidly, and that may
diminish the court's legitimacy.263
The process values of efficiency, fairness, and institutional legitimacy
illuminate our discussion of Justice Ginsburg's procedural philosophy. These
often colliding values aid our understanding of a process dynamic that
characterizes her judging style.
IV. A GLIMPSE OF JuSTICE GINSBURG'S CLASS ACTION JURISPRUDENCE
The framework of process values just discussed provides a basis for
assessing the procedural themes identified in Part II. This Part discusses those
themes as parts of Justice Ginsburg's jurisprudence of process and procedure.
It does so by focusing on her approach to class actions. Class action litigation
is particularly fertile ground because class action procedure implicates the
often colliding process values of efficiency, fairness, and institutional
legitimacy. This Part begins with a summary of the class action device and
the value tensions it embodies. It then analyzes Justice Ginsburg's opinions
in three major class action cases.
A. Value Conflicts in Class Action Litigation
The class action device allows a few people to represent many-a class-in
the litigation of a matter of interest to the class.2" Absent procedural
defects,"5 the judgment in a class action binds all class members.2' The class
effect an admirable substantive end. See id at 723-24. The court denied the defendant an
opportunity to present its legally recognized albeit dislikable defense. See id.
262 See, e.g., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997).
263 See David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARv. L. REV. 731, 737
(1987)(explaining that the public reacts cynically when it discovers that the court is
disingenuous in its reasoning).
26 Cramton, supra note 224, at 819. Class action suits are governed by FRCP 23.
26' As will be discussed below, class representatives must demonstrate that they meet certain
requirements before the court will certify a class. See infra notes 277-280 and accompanying
discussion. If a court improvidently determines that the requirements are met, the ensuing
judgment is subject to collateral attack.
266 However, certain types of class action suits give class members the option to "opt-out"
of the class, thereby preserving their right to prosecute their claim in a separate suit. FRCP
23(c)(2) provides in part: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances[.]
... The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the
class if the member so requests by a specified date .. " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
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action device, codified in FRCP 23, was designed to empower individual
litigants with small claims. 7 Rule 23(b)(3) allows atomized claimants, such
as individual consumers, to exert collective power.268 Rule 23(b)(3) thus
creates litigative power by aggregating numerous "negligible claim[s] into a
very large one."2" For plaintiffs and their counsel, the aggregation of claims
under the class action device makes litigation economically feasible and gives
them settlement leverage, particularly with corporate defendants.270
Although the class action was designed to promote justice for individual
claimants who might otherwise find the courts inaccessible, the device now
also serves the judicial system's interest in efficiency. Class actions reduce
the transaction and direct costs of class members. 27' In addition, class actions,
at least in concept, ease court congestion by reducing the number of case
filings.272
Fairness and efficiency values often collide in class actions. 273 By design,
class actions treat class members as a group rather than as individuals.274
Thus, class action litigation tends to overlook individual claimants' concerns
about substantive outcomes and procedural fairness. Class member autonomy,
participation, and dignity are exchanged for negotiating leverage and overall
267 See STEPHEN C. YEAZEu, FROM MEDIEVAL GRouP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
ACTION 248 (1987).
26 See id.
269 Id. Due to the power of aggregationextraordinary power derives from the certification
of a class. See George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 521,621 (1997). Particularly indicative of the power of certification
is that the certification of virtually every mass tort class action leads to settlement rather than
trial. See id. at 522.
270 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1350 (1995).
271 See Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338 (7th Cir. 1997). The Seventh Circuit
observed:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that
small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action
prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves this problem by aggregating the
relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an
attorney's) labor.
Id. at 344
272 See Cramton, supra note 224, at 818 ("Collective justice appeals to all parties to some
degree and to courts and judges almost without exception.").
273 See FED. R. CIv. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The Advisory Committee sought to
"achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other
undesirable results." Id. (emphasis added)(citing ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF
EQUITY 201 (1950)).
274 See Cramton, supra note 224, at 811 (recognizing the tension between individual justice
and collective justice in settlement class actions).
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efficiency. That class action judgments are binding on class members who had
no control over the litigation underscores the efficiency-fairness tension.275
Rule 23 therefore establishes procedural checks against the misuse of the
class action device.276 Under FRCP 23(a), class representatives must meet
certain prerequisites before the court will certify a class.277 The most
important criterion is that class representatives, who are parties to the suit,
adequately represent class members, who are not.27 After meeting Rule 23(a)
prerequisites, class representatives must demonstrate that their suit is
maintainable as one of three types of class actions under Rule 23(b).279 If the
275 See id at 825. Professor Cramton observes that there is usually no process for modifying
the amounts awarded in distributing a damage award to individual class members. Often, the
disposition of a class action irreversibly compromises an individual class member's right to
damages. See id.
276 The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1966 Amendments to Rule 23 state:
The amended rule describes in more practical terms the occasions for maintaining class
actions; provides that all class actions maintained to the end as such will result in
judgments including those whom the court finds to be members of the class, whether or
not the judgment is favorable to the class; and refers to the measures which can be taken
to assure the fair conduct of these actions....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (emphasis added)(ellipses in original)
277 Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf
of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2)
there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claim or defenses -of the class, and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
271 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4).
279 Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are
satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the
class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interest; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action
is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members
of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
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suit is maintained under Rule 23(b)(3), the class representatives must provide
notice to individual members of the class and inform them of their right to
exclude themselves from the class.' Finally, the district court must approve
a class action settlement to protect the interests of class members.28t
B. Justice Ginsburg and Class Actions
Justice Ginsburg's opinions suggest acute awareness of the process value
tensions inherent in class action litigation. Telecommunications Research &
Action Center v. Allnet Communication Services, Inc.,282 an associational
standing case, illustrates her disapproval of efficiency efforts to circumvent
FRCP 23's fairness protections for class members. The plaintiff in Allnet was
the Telecommunications Research and Action Center ('TRAC"), a non-profit
membership organization created to promote fair, reasonable, and nondiscrim-
inatory rates for communications services.3 TRAC sued Allnet Communica-
tions for maintaining discriminatory rates and for changing rates without
public notice.' Although the membership of TRAC numbered 12,000 when
it initiated the non-class action suit, 8 counsel for TRAC identified only five
or six members as Allnet subscribers. 86
The district court dismissed the action because TRAC lacked standing to
claim damages on behalf of its members. 87 The Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia affirmed.288 Writing for the court, then Judge Ginsburg
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by
or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered
in the management of a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b).
280 Rule 23(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the
members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort. The
notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude the member from the class
if the member so requests by a specified date, (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not,
will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
not request exclusion may, if the member desires, enter an appearance through counsel.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
2' FED. R. Cir. P. 23(e).
2 806 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
283 See id.
214 See id. at 1093-94.
285 See id. at 1094.
286 See id.
287 See id. Lack of standing was one of several grounds for dismissal.
288 See id.
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first reiterated that an association had standing to sue on behalf of its members
when
a) [the association's] members would otherwise have standing to sue in their
own right; (b) the interests [the association] seeks to protect are germane to the
organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.289
TRAC met the first two parts of the test,290 but failed the third prong because
money damages ordinarily required individual participation. 29 '
Judge Ginsburg then observed that the suit should have been brought as a
class action under FRCP 23(b)(3) subject to the procedural safeguards built
into the rule.2" A class action requires that class representatives fairly and
adequately represent the class, 293 and a FRCP 23(b)(3) class action requires
the "best notice practicable" of the suit to class members.294 The non-class
action suit brought by TRAC had none of these safeguards.295
Judge Ginsburg recognized that "[the] court, in matters such as this, writes
for a genre of cases, not for one day and case alone."296 If the court determin-
ed that TRAC had standing it would establish precedent that an association
could sue on behalf of its members even if those members had differing in-
terests in the outcome of the litigation. Such a rule would enable an associa-
tion's leaders to file an aggregated suit to gain litigation leverage and then
sacrifice the interests of individual association members. Despite the prospect
of increasing transactional costs to the plaintiff association, Judge Ginsburg
decided that the procedural safeguards of FRCP 23 were necessary to ensure
fairness to the individuals otherwise inadequately represented in the litigation.
Justice Ginsburg expressed a similar concern for individual litigant fairness
in Matsushita Electronic Industrial v. Epstein.2 97 Matsushita involved two
class action shareholder suits filed against MCA after it was acquired by
Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co ("Matsushita").298 The first suit was filed
in state court against MCA and its directors for breach of fiduciary duty.299
28' Id. (alterations in original).
'90 See id.
'9' See id. at 1095.
292 See id at 1096.
293 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
294 FED R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
195 See AlInet, 806 F.2d at 1096. By not filing a class action, TRAC avoided the exacting
scrutiny of Rule 23 certification criteria, which, in turn, left the interests of the individual
association members unconsidered. See id
296 Id. at 1095. Judge Ginsburg's remark reflects her consideration of stare decisis.
297 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
298 See id. at 370.
See id.
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The second suit, filed against Matsushita in federal court, alleged violations
of the Securities Exchange Commission's regulatory rules,3" over which the
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.3 ' The district court refused to
certify the class and dismissed the case.3"2
The shareholders appealed the federal court's decision in the second suit to
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.' 3 Thereafter, the parties to the first state
court suit agreed to a settlement establishing a two million dollar fund in
return for a global release of all claims based on the Matsushita-MCA
acquisition, including all federal claims.' The state court certified the class,
approved the settlement, and dismissed all the claims with prejudice.3 5
Matsushita then argued to the Ninth Circuit that the court-approved
settlement in the first suit barred the appeal of the federal action under the Full
Faith and Credit Act.306 The Ninth Circuit rejected Matsushita's argument,
holding that the settlement in the state action was not entitled to full faith and
credit. 37 The Supreme Court reversed. The Court determined that the Full
Faith and Credit Act afforded the settlement of the state court suit preclusive
effect over the federal action even though the federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over securities claims. 08
In contrast to the majority's focus on the full faith and credit doctrine,
Justice Ginsburg's separate concurring opinion emphasized that a state court
judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit unless it satisfied the
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.3 9 In
support of her argument, Justice Ginsburg cited Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 310 which held that minimal due process requirements-including
notice, an opportunity to be heard, a right to opt out, and adequate represen-
tation-had to be satisfied in order for a class action judgment to bind
absentee class members.3 ' She regarded adequate representation as the "sine
qua non for approval of a class action settlement[.] 31 2
300 See id.
'0' 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
302 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 370.
303 See id.
'04 See id. at 370-72.
305 See id. at 371-72.
'06 28 U.S.C. § 1738; see Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 372.
307 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 372.
301 See id. at 369.
3 See id. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
320 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
311 See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 395 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(citing Phillips Petroleum, 472 U.S. at 812).
312 Id. at 397 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)(citing Prezant v. Angelis,
636 A.2d 915, 926 (1994)).
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Justice Ginsburg observed a troublesome conflict of interest in the case.
Before approving the second settlement agreement, the Delaware court had
rejected an earlier agreement that provided no monetary benefit to class
members, released substantial federal claims, and awarded generous attorney's
fees. 3 The court had approved the second agreement, but observed that the
release of the federal claims was procured in return for meager compensation
for class members and a large fee for the class attorneys.314 Suspicion of
collusion ran high.31 5 Justice Ginsburg expressed wariness about the
defendants' use of the settlement class action device.a 6 Use of the temporary
settlement class device requires "telescoping the inquiry of adequate
representation into the examination of the fairness of the settlement," she
wrote. 7 Justice Ginsburg concurred with the majority's decision to remand
the case,31 8 but stressed "the centrality of the procedural due process
protection of adequate representation in class action lawsuits, emphatically
including those resolved by settlement. 319
Allnet and Matsushita highlight salient points in Justice Ginsburg's
approach to class action litigation. In each case, the courts were faced with
competing concerns of fairness and efficiency. In both cases, Justice
Ginsburg argued forcefully that efficiency concerns did not subvert procedural
fairness for individual claimants. The Court's most recent pronouncement on
class action procedure, Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor a23 replayed this
value tension in the context of mass tort litigation and the stresses it places
upon the judiciary.
C. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor
Amchem is the first case in which the Supreme Court addressed the recent
phenomenon of the employment of the class action device for the sole purpose
313 See id. at 391 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
314 See id. at 392. The establishment of the two million settlement fund awarded
shareholders two to three cents per share before payment of fees and costs. See id. at 392.
However, the state court determined that the class would be best served by settlement of the
litigation, and that the terms of the settlement were fair and reasonable. See id. at 392.
31S See id. at 393.
316 See id at 396-97; see also infra note 321 for a general discussion of the settlement class
action device.
117 Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 397 n.6 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3 See id. at 388 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3 Id. at 399.
320 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
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of settling mass tort cases. 32' The facts of Amchem are complex. We
therefore summarize Amchem's background.
1. The background of Amchem
The parties in Amchem handled the asbestos claims as a mass tort. Mass
torts litigation generally refers to the aggregation of large numbers of claims
that arise from similar events or transactions.322 Mass tort litigation inundated
federal courts in 1980s and 1990s323 as claimants sought compensation under
32' Amchem was a settlement class action. See id. at 597. FRCP 23 makes no reference to
the settlement class action device. Rather, the device is a judicially created procedure. See In
re General Motors Corp. Pick-up Truck Fuel Tank Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 777-78 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied sub nont. General Motors v. French, 516 U.S. 824 (1995)(observing that the first Manual
for Complex Litigation strongly disapproved of settlement classes, but because courts
increasingly used the device, later manuals endorsed usage of the device under carefully
controlled circumstances). A settlement class action is never intended to be litigated.
Settlement class actions are filed for the sole purpose of binding class members to a settlement
agreement reached by the class representatives and defendants. Typically, the complaint, answer
and settlement agreement are all filed at the same time or one closely following the other. The
court is left to approve the settlement pursuant to FRCP 23(e). The controversy engendered by
settlement class actions, as exemplified in Amchem, stems from the issue of whether the court
should engage in analysis of the class certification criteria of FRCP 23(a) and (b) in approving
the settlement. See generally General Motors, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995). See infra note 330
for mass tort cases that have invoked the class action device for settlement purposes.
" The American Law Institute proposes the following definition of a "mass tort":
From the process perspective, the salient defining characteristics of a mass tort include:
(1) numerous victims who have filed or might file damage claims against the same
defendant(s);
(2) claims arising from a single event or transaction, or from a series of similar events or
transactions spread over time;
(3) questions of law and fact that are complex and expensive to litigate and
adjudicate-frequently questions that are scientific and technological in nature;
(4) important issues of law and fact which are identical or common to all or substantial
subgroups of the claims;
(5) injuries that are widely dispersed over time, territory, and jurisdiction;
(6) causal indeterminancy--especially in cases involving toxic substance exposure--that
precludes use of conventional procedures to determine and standards to measure any
causal connection between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's tortious conduct;
(7) disease and other injuries from long delayed latent risks, especially in cases involving
toxic substance exposure.
2 AMERICAN LAW INSTrrnTE, ENrERPRISE RESPONSBmrY FOR PERSONAL INJURY, REPORTER'S
STUDY 389 (1991).
323 See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1356. Professor Coffee observed, "Hundreds of thousands
of people sued scores of corporations for losses due to injuries or diseases that they attributed
to catastrophic events, pharmaceutical products, medical devices or toxic substances." Id.
(quoting Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury
Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 961 (1993)).
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state law from manufacturers of asbestos products,324 breast implants,325
intrauterine devices326 and automobiles.327 As court congestion increased,
some courts and attorneys turned to class actions as an aggregation device.328
Defendants in mass tort cases quickly recognized the strategic utility of
FRCP 23 in obtaining cheap global settlements. 329 Defendants could entice
plaintiffs' counsel into aggregating claimants into classes using Rule 23 and
then negotiating a global settlement that benefited plaintiffs, their attorneys,
a small number of class members, and, most of all, the defendants.33 Initially,
324 See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996)(asbestos
litigation).
31 See, e.g., In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-10000 -
S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994)(breast implants litigation).
326 See, e.g., In re N. Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 521 F. Supp.
1188 (N.D. Cal.), modified, 526 F. Supp. 887 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983)(intrauterine devices litigation).
3217 See, e.g., In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55
F.3d 768 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. General Motors v. French, 516 U.S. 824
(1995)(automobiles products liability litigation).
31 See Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 43
(1991).
32 See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1349. See also infra note 330 and the accompanying
discussion for a more thorough treatment of defendants' use of FRCP 23 to their own
advantage. The class action device can be said to have been transformed from the plaintiffs
"sword" into the defendant's "shield." See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1350.
330 Collusion in mass torts litigation usually entails an agreement between the defendants and
plaintiffs' counsel to settle the case below value in return for attorneys' fees that are above
market value. See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1367-84. Defendants have invented a number of
devices of collusion. Examples of such devices include the "scrip settlement," which is a
nonpecuniary settlement in the form of discount coupons redeemable by members of the injured
class to purchase defendant's product at a discount. See id. at 1367-68; see also General
Motors, 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995)(scrutinizing auto-manufacturer's proposed settlement in the
form of a scrip certificate to class members in the amount of $1,000 which they could redeem
for the purchase of manufacturer's brand of trucks). The "cy press settlement" involves an
agreement by the defendant to make a payment of goods or services, not directly to the class
members, but to a third party for the indirect benefit of the plaintiff class. See Coffee, supra
note 270, at 1368; see also In re Matzo Food Prods. Litig., 159 F.R.D. 600 (D.N.J.
1994)(refusing to approve defendant's proposal to settle an antitrust class action by creating a
fund that would distribute defendant's food products to charities and paying plaintiffs' attorneys
fees). The "reverse auction" is a competition among plaintiffs' attorneys initiated by the
defendants to determine which team of attorneys will settle with the defendants first. Since each
team of lawyers is prosecuting the same allegations, the first team to settle essentially precludes
the others from litigating their cases. See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1370; see also Grimes v.
Vitalink Communications Corp., 17 F.3d 1553 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 986
(1994)(holding that a release contained in a state court judgment precludes subsequent federal
securities action arising from the same facts, even though the state court has no jurisdiction to
hear exclusive federal securities claims).
"Inventory settlements" are the subject of Amchem. A mass tort plaintiffs attorney
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such collusion met little resistance.33
Amchem is a particularized version of this mass tort phenomenon. The
claimants were workers exposed to asbestos in the 1940s and 1950s who
manifested injuries beginning in the 1960s.332 The claimants filed a stream of
individual asbestos cases in federal courts.333 Realizing the strain of asbestos
litigation on federal courts, eight federal judges urged the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL Panel") to consolidate all asbestos cases in a
single district.33' The MDL Panel agreed and in 1991 transferred all pending
federal court asbestos cases to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.335
Following the transfer, the plaintiffs and defendants formed separate
steering committees. 336 Court-appointed plaintiffs' counsel337 and counsel for
the Center for Claims Resolution ("CCR"), a consortium of 20 former
asbestos manufacturers, began negotiations with an eye toward creating a
settlement that would resolve both present and future claims.338 Plaintiffs'
counsel and defendants eventually agreed to settle existing and future claims
typically serves as counsel to an "inventory" of cases which he or she wishes to settle as
expeditiously as possible. See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1373. Defendants, on the other hand,
are-more concerned about the class of future claimants, which is indeterminable in size and may
be much larger than the class of present claimants. See id. It is to the advantage of both
defendants and plaintiffs' counsel to trade favors-defendants agree to settle the plaintiff's
attorney's inventory of cases in return for a global settlement of future claims against defendants
on terms favorable to them. See id. The global settlement is usually made binding on future
claimants by way of a settlement class action (i.e., one created only for settlement purposes).
See id at 1373-74. Future claimants, who may be unaware or apathetic about their potential to
bring a claim, have no incentive to decide carefully whether to opt out of such class actions. See
Cramton, supra note 224, at 828.
... See Coffee, supra note 270, at 1350-52. Professor Coffee points out that the mass tort
class action is uniquely vulnerable to the danger of collusion between defendants and plaintiffs'
counsel for three reasons: 1) courts, faced with massive dockets, may be more willing to
approve of suspicious settlements that they ordinarily would reject; 2) the court's primary
method of regulating plaintiffs' counsel's actions in class actions--control over attorneys'
fees--loses potency in the mass torts context because defendants can entice the attorneys with
out-of-court compensation over which the court has no control; 3) future claimants (those who
have yet to experience any symptoms or illnesses) are often apathetic about mass tort actions
brought on their behalf, and therefore, usually fail to object to under-valued settlements of their
claims. See id.
332 See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996).
333 See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415, 418-19 (J.P.M.L.
1991)(reporting the findings of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos).
334 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997).
331 See id.; see also Asbestos Prods., 771 F. Supp. at 424.
336 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 599.
331 See id. Judge Weiner, who presided over the pretrial proceedings of the consolidated
case, appointed Ronald Motley, Gene Locks, and later Joseph F. Rice, as plaintiffs' class
counsel in the action. See id.
338 See id. at 600.
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in two separate agreements, one binding on all future claimants, and the other
settling the existing claims for $200 million.339
On behalf of future claimants, on January 5, 1993, the settling parties filed
a complaint; an answer; a joint motion seeking conditional class certification
for purposes of settlement; and a stipulation of settlement proposing to settle
all present and future claims of class members against CCR companies for
asbestos-related personal injury or death that were not filed before January 15,
1993.' The proposed settlement established an administrative procedure for
determining individual compensation of class members. 4 In 1993, Judge
Reed approved the stipulation of settlement and certified the settlement
class.342
Objectors, consisting of members of the plaintiff class, 343 challenged the
settlement on various grounds, including the adequacy of representation,
justiciability, subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction and the
adequacy of class notice.3" The objectors expressed concern about the
inadequacy of the compensation for certain claimants, especially those who
did not presently manifest asbestos-related health problems.345 The Third
339 See id. at 601.
' See id. at 601-02. The class consisted of
(1) all persons exposed occupationally or through the occupational exposure of a spouse
or household member to asbestos-containing products or asbestos supplied by any CCR
defendant, and (2) spouses and family members of such persons, who had not filed an
asbestos-related lawsuit against a CCR defendant as of the date the class action was
commenced.
Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 83 F.3d at 610, 619 (3d Cir. 1996).
341 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 603. As the first step of the administrative procedure, a clai-
mant would have to meet specific medical and exposure criteria. See id. If the criteria are met,
compensation is provided for four categories of diseases. See id. The stipulation fixed a range
of damages that CCR would award for each disease for eligible claimants. See id. at 603-04.
There are caps on the amount of damages a particular claimant may recover and on the
number of qualifying claimants who may be paid in any given year. See id at 604. Recovery
exceeding the cap is allowed for "extraordinary" claims, but only a limited number of claims can
be found to be "extraordinary." See id There is also a cap on the total amount of compensation
available to claimants. See id.
Some claimants who qualify for compensation under the settlement are allowed to file
a claim in court. See id at 605. However, the settlement limits the number of such exceptions.
See id Additionally, claimants who have "pleural" conditions-an accumulation of plaque on
the lungs due to asbestos that does not cause physical impairment--are not eligible for compen-
sation. See id. at 604. Pleural claimants regularly received substantial money damages in
individual tort suits. See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 620. The stipulation allowed each defendant to
withdraw from the settlement after ten years, but plaintiffs were bound by the settlement in
perpetuity. See Amchem, at 604-05.
342 See id. at 606.
3' See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 258 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
3" See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 622.
'4' See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 607-08.
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Circuit ruled that a settlement class action must satisfy the requirements of
FRCP 23(a) and (b)(3).6
The court found that under 23(b)(3) common questions of fact and law did
not predominate.4 7 The court also observed serious intra-class conflicts that
precluded satisfaction of the adequacy of representation requirement. It was
unfair, the court opined, to bind exposure-only class members who may be
insufficiently informed to make a reasoned decision of whether to opt out of
the class.34 The court decertified the class.4 9
2. Justice Ginsburg's opinion
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion affirming the Third Circuit's
decision.350 She first recognized the division among courts over the issue of
whether the certification of settlement classes required fulfillment of FRCP
23's certification criteria.35' She confirmed that the certification requirements
did apply in the settlement class context.352 Rule 23 procedural safeguards
protecting absentee class members "demand undiluted, even heightened, atten-
tion in the settlement context. 353 Certification of a settlement class requires
added scrutiny of FRCP 23 requirements because unlike a class action certi-
fied for trial, the court has no future opportunity to adjust the class.354
Turning to the specific class-certification criteria, Justice Ginsburg
emphasized the vital purposes served. The requirements of FRCP 23(a) and
(b), she wrote, are not mere procedural technicalities to which courts pay lip-
service; rather, they compel careful inquiry into the appropriateness of
346 See Georgine, 83 F.3d at 624-25.
147 See id. at 626-30.
34 See id. at 633.
349 See id. at 618.
0 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597.
31, See id. at 618. The Court cited to the following cases to illustrate the divide among
federal courts: In re Asbestos Litig., 90 F.3d 963,975 (5th Cir. 1996)("in settlement class con-
text, common issues arise from the settlement itself')(citation omitted), cert. pending, Nos. 96-
1379, 96-1394; White v. National Football League, 41 F.3d 402 408 (8th Cir. 1994) ("adequacy
of class representation... is ultimately determined by the settlement itself'), cert. denied, 515
U.S. 1137 (1995); In re A.H. Robins Co., 80 F.2d 709, 740 (4th Cir.)("[i]f not a ground for
certification per se, certainly settlement should be a factor, and an important factor, to be
considered when determining certification"), cert. denied sub non. Anderson v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 493 U.S. 959 (1989); Malchman v. Davis, 761 F.2d 893, 900 (2d Cir. 1985)
(certification was appropriate, in part, because "the interests of the members of the broadened
class in the settlement agreement were commonly held"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143 (1986).
352 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
353 id.
31 See id.; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) and (d)(conferring power to the court to make
orders pertaining to the class after certification).
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invoking the class action device:
The safeguards provided by the Rule 23(a) and (b) class-qualifying criteria, we
emphasize, are not impractical impediments-checks shorn of utility-in the
settlement class context First, the standards set for the protection of absent class
members serve to inhibit appraisals of the chancellor's foot kind-class
certifications dependent upon the court's gestalt judgment or overarching
impression of the settlement's fairness. "'
It is not enough to submit a proposed settlement class action to scrutiny
under FRCP 23(e).356 Under FRCP 23(e), any settlement of a class action
must be approved by the court. The inquiry in approving a settlement under
FRCP 23(e) is whether the settlement is "fundamentally fair, adequate, and
reasonable." '357
That standard of analysis, Justice Ginsburg said, is inadequate to ascertain
whether the interests of class members are served by the settlement:
[I]f a fairness inquiry under Rule 23(e) controlled certification, eclipsing Rule
23(a) and (b), and permitting class designation despite the impossibility of
litigation, both class counsel and court would be disarmed.358
Federal courts, therefore, lack authority to certify a settlement class on the
ground of overall fairness. Certification under those circumstances would
vitiate most of the procedural protections of FRCP 23."'
The facts of Amchem, Justice Ginsburg observed, reveal the danger of
abandoning those protections. The interests of the class members and class
representatives were not aligned.3' A significant disparity existed between
the value of recovery for class members who were currently injured and for
those who were only exposed to asbestos.36 Further, Justice Ginsburg
perceived a lack of "structural assurance of fair and adequate representation
311 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
356 FRCP 23(e) provides: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without
the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to
all members of the class in such manner as the court directs." FED. R. CIrv. P. 23(e).
357 5 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.85 (3d ed. 1997); see also In
re Pacific Enter. Secur. Litig., 47 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1995)(affirming the district court's
determination that the proposed settlement was "fundamentally fair, adequate, and reasonable"
under Rule 23(e)); Class Plaintiffs v. City of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the "fundamentally fair, adequate and reasonable" standard is "universal"); County
of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., Inc., 726 F.2d 1295, 1323 (2d Cir. 1990)(noting that
a court must scrutinize a settlement proposal to ensure that it is fair, adequate and reasonable).
358 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621.
359 See id. at 621-22.
'60 See id. at 626.
361 See id.
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for the diverse groups and individuals affected."' Since the class representa-
tives in this case did not represent the various interests of the class, and since
the class was not divided into subclasses, some class members were likely to
have been left without an advocate.3 63
Justice Ginsburg also observed that the class was deficient in the sense that
common questions of law or fact among members of the class did not
predominate over individual questions.3" The "class members' shared
experience of asbestos exposure and their common 'interest in receiving
prompt and fair compensation for their claims"' did not supply the requisite
commonality in law or fact.365
D. Justice Ginsburg's Process Jurisprudence
What do Justice Ginsburg's class action opinions reveal about her process
jurisprudence? We observe initially that class action litigation involves an
interplay among the three, sometimes conflicting, process values-efficiency,
fairness and institutional legitimacy--and Justice Ginsburg's writing evinces
careful effort to accommodate all three, but with differing emphases under
differing circumstances. She does not pay fealty to a particular process value.
Instead, the policies underlying the procedure in question and the specific
facts of a case animate her procedural decisionmaking. Consistent with this
approach, Justice Ginsburg's opinions emphasize the importance of fairness
at certain times and court efficiency at others.3
Her opinions in Allnet, Matsushita and Amchem, in particular, wrestle with
the tension between efficiency and fairness. The risk of shortchanging the
interests of absentee class members runs high in class action litigation, and the
procedural safeguards built into FRCP 23 are designed to mitigate that
possibility. For that reason, concerns of efficiency, both in the systemic and
the individual sense, although important to Justice Ginsburg, do not compel
her to approve of an otherwise unfair process for class members.
In Allnet, for example, the prospect of burdening the plaintiffs with added
transaction costs did not persuade her that the court should have granted them
standing to litigate against Allnet on behalf of all organization members.367
362 Id. at 627.
363 See id.
3" See id at 622; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(requiring predominance of questions of
law or fact).
36 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 622 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 316
(E.D. Pa. 1994)).
36 See supra Part II.
367 See Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Alinet Commun. Servs., Inc., 806
F.2d 1093, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Judge Ginsburg recounted the following exchange during
oral argument:
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The efficiency achieved by TRAC's associational form of action did not
justify the circumvention of safeguards assuring the adequacy of representa-
tion of the association's members. In Justice Ginsburg's view, the suit should
have been brought as a class action.
In Matsushita, Justice Ginsburg perceived the majority's holding to be
skewed in favor of court efficiency-it lightened federal court dockets by
barring the adjudication of claims already settled and approved by a state
court. Hints of collusion in the state court settlement-the release of all
claims against the defendant, including federal claims over which federal
courts had exclusive jurisdiction, in exchange for undervalued compensation
for the shareholders and a handsome fee for the class attomeys368 _suggested
a process failure. For this reason, Justice Ginsburg declined to join the
majority. Despite the costly and time-consuming prospect of allowing certain
class claimants "more than one day in court, '3 69 as the majority put it, Justice
Ginsburg maintained that fairness commanded a more searching examination
of whether the state court judgment respected the class members' rights to fair
participation or representation in the litigation.
Amchem perhaps most clearly reveals Justice Ginsburg's thoughtful
handling of the fairness-efficiency dynamic. As a mass tort case, Amchem
threatened to inundate the federal judiciary with massive, repetitious litigation
involving state law issues and large numbers of parties.37° Faced with an
ostensible assault on the functioning capacity of the federal courts, Justice
Ginsburg first considered the efficiency-enhancing aspects of FRCP 23:
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the
problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to
bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights. -A class action solves this
problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something
worth someone's (usually an attorney's) labor.37'
More tellingly, TRAC's counsel stated at oral argument that the form of action the
organization selected was influenced by this consideration: "[I]t didn't involve the kind
of notice requirements and expense that a class action might." This colloquy took place:
Court: Is it the notice-the cost of giving notice-that led you away from the class
action?
Counsel: That's correct in that there were virtually no up-front costs to the association
in utilizing this remedy....
Id. (ellipses in original).
3" See Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Epstein, 519 U.S. 367, 388 (1996)(Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
'69 Allnet, 806 F.2d at 881.
3 0 See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 597-98 (citing REPORT OFTHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD Hoc
COMMrTTEE ON ASBESTOS LMIGATION 2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
"" Id. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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Justice Ginsburg then examined how the class action device constrained the
autonomy and participation rights of individual class members:
Sensitive to the competing tugs of individual autonomy for those who might
prefer to go it alone or in a smaller unit, on the one hand, and systemic efficiency
on the other, the Reporter for the 1966 amendments cautioned: 'The new
provision invites a close look at the case before it is accepted as a class action
,372
Personal injuries inflicted on an individual's body are specific and personal.373
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg observed that "[e]ach plaintiff [in an action
involving claims for personal injury and death] has a significant interest in
individually controlling the prosecution of [his case]; each ha[s] a substantial
stake in making individual decisions on whether and when to settle. 374
Justice Ginsburg's initial observations in Amchem highlight the efficiency-
fairness dialectic in class actions. The object of FRCP 23 is to "'achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote . . . uniformity of
decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.'" 375 Rule 23 encroaches
on individual autonomy while it promotes efficiency.376
For Justice Ginsburg, the Amchem class action was a prime example of the
untoward results of sacrificing procedural fairness. Plaintiffs counsel
selected class representatives whose interests did not align with those of future
claimants.377 As claimants with matured claims, the named plaintiffs sought
immediate compensation.378 Future claimants, on the other hand, were
interested in "ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future.
' 37 9
Under the proposed settlement, present claimants benefited substantially while
future claimants received undervalued returns for their sacrifice of control
over participation in the litigation.
31 Id. at 615 (quoting Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966
Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356,390 (1967)).
373 See Resnik, supra note 328, at 23.
374 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 616 (alterations in original)(intemal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Georgine, 83 F.3d at 633).
3I Id. at 615 (alteration in original)(quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee's
note).
376 See Resnik, supra note 328, at 23. Class actions operate in the manner of a sacrifice-
class members surrender their right of control and participation in the litigation of their claims
in return for increased effectiveness in securing corrective justice and individual compensation.
See id. Rule 23's certification requirements, particularly "adequacy of representation,"
"predominance," and "superiority," ensure that the equation balances in favor of absent class
members. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note; see also supra notes 273 and 276.
3" See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 626.
378 See id.
379 Id.
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The structure of the proposed settlement thus emitted strong signals of
collusion between plaintiff's counsel and defendants. To Justice Ginsburg,
that was a defacto violation of the adequacy of representation requirement.80
When the representatives or counsel bargain away the interests of the class
members in return for personal gain, the class members are left bereft of not
only representation, but also a fair outcome.
Allnet, Matsushita and Amchem suggest that the enormous systemic stress
of asbestos litigation is insufficient, in itself, to convince Justice Ginsburg to
certify a procedurally faulty class action. It would be a misreading of Justice
Ginsburg's opinions in Allnet, Matsushita, and Amchem, however, to conclude
that she is insensitive to efficiency-oriented arguments. She is aware that
procedure can be instrumental in conserving the limited resources available
to courts.38' When judicial economy can be promoted by stretching a
procedural rule without sacrificing substantially fairness to litigants, Justice
Ginsburg is at times willing to stretch the rule to promote efficiency. In
Caterpillar, for example, she implicitly modified the traditional timeframe for
establishing subject matter jurisdiction because considerations of "finality,
The interests of the class representatives must not be antagonistic toward those of the
class members. See, e.g., Crawford v. Honig, 37 F.3d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1994)(noting that
adequate representation "depends on the qualifications of counsel for the representatives, an
absence of antagonism, a sharing of interests between representatives and absentees, and the
unlikelihood that the suit is collusive."); Retired Chicago Police Ass'n v. Chicago, 7 F.3d 584,
598 (7th Cir. 1993)(stating that the two parts of the adequacy of representation requirement are
the adequacy of class counsel and the adequacy of representation of the "different, separate, and
distinct interest[s]" of class members); In re the Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, 960 F.2d 285,
291 (2d Cir. 1992)(holding that adequacy of representation is measured by the dual standards
of class counsel being qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation, and of the class
members not holding interests that are antagonistic to one another).
Additionally, the class representatives must have interests in the litigation that operate
as an incentive for them to represent the class claims vigorously through class counsel. See,
e.g., In re American Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir. 1996)(requiring class
representative to share common interests with absent class members and to vigorously represent
the interests of the class through qualified counsel); Andrews v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 95
F.3d 1014, 1023 (1 1th Cir. 1996)(defining adequacy of representation to mean that the class
representative shares common interests with class members and will vigorously protect class
interests through qualified counsel); Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)(stating
that a court's inquiry into adequacy of representation should include whether the putative class
representative has the ability and incentive to represent the class claims vigorously).
38, See, e.g., BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). In Gore, Justice
Ginsburg wrote a dissent criticizing the majority for constitutionalizing the law of punitive
damages. See id. at 1614-20 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority position permitted the
Supreme Court to review the constitutionality of state high court decisions regarding punitive
damage awards. See id at 1595-98. Justice Ginsburg voiced concern that "the Court will work
at this business alone. It will not be aided by the federal district courts and courts of appeals.
It will be the only federal court policing the area." Id. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1998 / JURISPRUDENCE OF PROCESS
efficiency, and economy . . . [were] overwhelming," '382 and because the
removal scheme devised by Congress allowed for "expeditious superinten-
dence by district courts."3 3 Justice Ginsburg's ruling precluded the plaintiffs
from relitigating their state claims in their court of choice-state court.
The safest description of Justice Ginsburg's approach to the efficiency-
fairness tension in complex cases is that it defies simplistic description.3"4
Whether her procedural decision in a particular case tips in favor of fairness
or efficiency depends on the specific facts before the Court and the value
concerns underlying the rule, both in the particular case and the genre of
similar cases, a dynamic discussed further in the next Part.
At bottom, Justice Ginsburg's class action opinions evince an overarching
concern for institutional legitimacy, which grows out of her respect for the
"[riule of law virtues of consistency, predictability, clarity, and stability."3 5
Her application of FRCP 23 reinforced the legitimacy of the judiciary in two
ways: by preserving the integrity of FRCP 23 and by approving only careful,
restrained exercises of federal court authority. Her insistence on "heightened
attention" 386 to FRCP 23's requirements contributes to public perception of the
federal judiciary as a procedurally fair institution. If the Court had validated
the Amchem settlement class while bypassing the class certification criteria,
it would probably have engendered two negative results. First, the public
would likely perceive the federal judiciary as an arbitrary, result-oriented
institution that abides by its own rules only when compelled to do so. Second,
the Court would likely have undermined FRCP 23, relegating it to a "check[]
shorn of utility. ' 387 Neither result is conducive to litigant, lawyer, or public
faith in the judicial system, and certainly not to the integrity of federal class
actions.
Amchem also tempted the Court to wield federal judicial power broadly.
Plaintiff's counsel and defendants invited the Court to approve a use of FRCP
23 that approximated a legislative solution to the asbestos litigation crisis. As
a subscriber of the "measured movement" approach to judicial decision-
making, Justice Ginsburg was unwilling to condone such an expansive
31 Caterpillar v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 75 (1996).
383 Id. at 76.
31 That Justice Ginsburg's emphasis shifts from fairness to efficiency and vice-versa
underscores the inappropriateness of assigning her a conventional label. One may be tempted
to portray her as liberal because she sometimes favors an individual litigant's "day in court"
over efficiency, but that is an invalid assumption. Part V posits a more sophisticated
explanation of her procedural decisions in the form of values proceduralism.
385 Ginsburg, Judicial Voice, supra note 98, at 1191. Consistency, predictability, clarity, and
stability also seem to be value concerns that permeate her thoughts on stare decisis. See supra
note 105 and accompanying text.
3 Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
387 Id. at 621.
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application of Rule 23. Approval of the proposed settlement in Amchem
would be akin to establishing a court-ordained, "nationwide administrative
claims processing regime[.] '3 ss Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that such an
approach may "provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compen-
sating victims of asbestos exposure," but "Congress... has not adopted such
a solution. 3 s9 In restraining the Court from acting beyond its prescribed
authority, Justice Ginsburg appeared to preempt public criticism of a
legislating Court.
At the root of Justice Ginsburg's concern for institutional legitimacy is her
belief that the rule of law is viable only when the court's directives are clear
and reasonable and the judiciary works incessantly to accommodate compet-
ing process values. Her argument in Arizonans and Agostini resurfaces in
Amchem: the legitimacy of the Court depends in part on adherence to
procedural rules designed to assure dignity and participation, even when
straying from the rules might yield a substantively satisfying or efficient
result.390 Succumbing to the temptation to stray undermines the potency of the
procedural device and portrays the Court as vulnerable to social and political
pressures."a ' In her view, the Court should confine its authority to the power
prescribed in formal procedural rules that by design reflect a balance of
competing values. In keeping with this exercise of restraint, the Court must
refrain from interpretive leaps such as that suggested by the class counsel and
the defendants in Amchem. At the same time, when the Court's determina-
tions are not constrained by formally prescribed rules--e.g., in determining
whether subject matter jurisdiction at the moment of judgment is sufficient,
as in Caterpillar--then the Court should formulate its own procedural rules
in a manner that best accommodates the full range of competing process
values for the "genre of cases."
Although Allnet, Matsushita, Amchem, and Caterpillar do not comprise a
definitive blueprint of Justice Ginsburg's approach of legal process and
388 Id. at 628.
9 Id. at 628-29. Justice Ginsburg's concern that the proposed settlement Amchem would
overstep the authority of the judiciary seems similar to Lon Fuller's argument that courts should
not decide substantive legal questions involving "polycentric" tasks. See Lon Fuller, The Forms
and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REv. 353, 394-404 (1978). A polycentric task is one
that requires consideration of the interests of a multiplicity of parties. See id. at 395. Since
disputes that are polycentric in nature can be resolved in more than one way, Fuller argues that
the court should avoid them, as it is not equipped to make such complex policy decisions. See
ia at 395-98. In Amchem, there was no singular method of settling the asbestos litigation that
would have served the conflicting interests of all class members. The solution pressed upon the
Court arguably involved policymaking to a degree that it could not competently, nor prudently,
handle.
390 See supra notes 254-263 and accompanying discussion.
31 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
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procedure, they do provide preliminary insight. Her judicial opinions address
the efficiency-fairness tension, along with the Court's broader objective of
preserving its legitimacy. None of those values, taken alone, dictate her
decisions. Nonetheless, the interplay among those values animates her
procedural decisionmaking. The final Part of this article endeavors to more
fully describe that dynamic.
IV. VALUES PROCEDURALISM
Justice Ginsburg's writings confirm that her views on judicial process are
integral to her decisionmaking. Her opinions in class action cases provide
insight into her approach to the procedural aspects of legal process, and on a
more general level, her jurisprudence. We draw two inferences from these
cases. First, the value choices she makes in rendering a procedural decision
are usually deliberate and calculated. As she expressed in Allnet, her judicial
opinions are written for a "genre of cases, not for one day and case alone."
3 92
Aware of the precedential impact of her opinions, she is careful not to
articulate a view that may be used in a future case to disrupt the balance
among process values. Allnet was such a case, in which she declined standing
to the plaintiff association because a contrary ruling would have opened the
door to potentially unfair and abusive associational litigation.
The second inference, a correlative of the first, is that Justice Ginsburg is
averse to applying procedural rules in a "mechanical" or "mindless"
fashion.393 Her dynamic rather than dogmatic approach finds guidance not
only from the terms of a rule,394 but also from contextual considerations of
fact, policy, and value. By dynamism we mean that her jurisprudence of
process and procedure is not fixed on any particular value. Her procedural
decisions reflect her sensitivity to the commonality and antagonism that exists
among process values.
3' Telecommunications Research & Action Ctr. v. Allnet, 806 F.2d 1093, 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1986).
393 See Center for Nuclear Responsibility v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 781
F.2d 935, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1986)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)(rejecting the majority's "mindless"
application of Rule 58); Spann v. Colonial Village, Inc., 899 F.2d 24, 32 n.4 (D.C. Cir.
1990)(citing United States v. Perez, 736 F.2d 236, 237-38 (5th Cir. 1984))(disfavoring the
"mindless" application of Rule 58).
394 That Justice Ginsburg does not necessarily confine herself to the text of a rule in
determining the correct procedural result in a case does not mean that she believes judges are
free to abrogate the procedural requirements of a rule. To the contrary, as previously discussed
in Part II.C., she insists on the accurate application of procedure. See Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203, 212 (1997), 521 U.S. at 212; see also supra notes 176-95 and accompanying
discussion. We merely suggest that what is "accurate" in her view depends upon the contextual
and value considerations attendant to a given case.
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Dispelling the notion that Justice Ginsburg's approach to process and
procedure is one-dimensional is but one step in doing justice for the Justice.
The class action cases permit the next step: a description of the dynamic.
The remainder of this Part takes up this task. Before proceeding, however, we
bear in mind that our conclusions are based on a limited universe of ever-
expanding information.
We know from her judicial opinions that Justice Ginsburg strives to be a
principled decisionmaker; the question that remains is by what principles she
abides. In hopes of illuminating the interplay of those principles, we suggest
a descriptive term: values proceduralism. 3 95 Values proceduralism refers to
the interpretation or application of open-ended or ambiguous procedural rules
in a manner that reflects a context-dependent accommodation of process
values. In following this mode of procedural decisionmaking, a jurist is not
captivated by concerns emanating from a particular process value. She does
not even arrive at a decision by weighing value concerns anew in every case,
as a utilitarian or law and economics theorist engages in cost-benefits analysis.
Rather, the jurist looks at the technical requirements and larger aims of the
procedural rule in question and examines the differing balances of process
values served by one construction of the rule rather than another. She then
selects the construction that best reflects the accommodation of values that she
perceives to be embodied in the rule.396 Justice Ginsburg's writings tend to
embrace this values proceduralism approach.
Integral to the values proceduralism approach is careful attention to the
process value concerns embodied in specific procedures. Only analysis of the
formation of a procedural rule reveals its purposes and its accommodation of
competing process values. Once a judge identifies those aspects of a rule, she
can better determine how they should play out with the facts presented in a
given case.
Values proceduralism describes Justice Ginsburg's practice of looking
closely at the value concerns underlying a rule for guidance in construing and
applying the rule. Justice Ginsburg's opinions in Amchem and Agostini
illustrate this approach. In Amchem, Justice Ginsburg refused to approve a
settlement class that bypasses the safeguards in FRCP 23, for that would
facilitate the convenient, yet unfair, settlement of future claims, a result
311 We hope that "values proceduralism," as a newly-minted term, will avoid the problems
associated with conventional labels. See supra note 6 and accompanying discussion.
391 Values proceduralism runs parallel, in some respects, to Legal Process theory. Members
of the Legal Process movement argue that judges should develop the common law in light of
the purposes and policies behind the legal rules they are obligated to interpret and apply. See
Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467,505-08 (1988)(book review)
(summarizing the Legal Process movement). In taking a values proceduralism approach, as we
suggest she does, Justice Ginsburg's judging style appears to bear the influence of Legal Process
theory.
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inconsistent with the balance between efficiency and fair representation that
is structured into FRCP 23. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg disagreed with the
majority's employment of FRCP 60(b) in Agostini to revisit the Court's
holding in Aguilar. In her view, Rule 60(b) is not a tool for reopening the
litigation of legal or factual claims that form the basis of a judgment.
Construing the rule as the majority did would undermine the integrity of the
Court, a process value firmly embedded in the rule.397
Conceptualizing Justice Ginsburg's procedural approach as one of values
proceduralism offers a broad framework for understanding how the diverse
themes in Justice Ginsburg's writings comprise her judicial philosophy. The
numerous concerns that surface in her writings are taken by some as
inconsistencies in her procedural jurisprudence, or as indications of her
"moderate" style of judging. Both of these interpretations misconstrue her
approach to procedural aspects of legal process.398 Justice Ginsburg's
opinions disclose no predilection toward any one value concern; they instead
highlight her aim of construing and applying procedural rules in ways that best
reflect the accommodation of the value concerns embedded in the rules.
Implicit in the values proceduralism approach is faith in the capacity of
391 That the integrity of the courts is a concern embodied in Rule 60(b)(5) is evinced by the
conditions the rule establishes for setting aside a final judgment or order. See FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(5). Rule 60(b)(5) dictates that courts cannot nullify a prior judicial pronouncement
arbitrarily. Relief from a judgment or order is proper only in circumstances where denial of
such relief would be unjust.
398 For instance, Justice Ginsburg has rendered decisions that favor efficiency in some
instances and fairness in others. Her pattern of judicial behavior makes sense in light of the
differing value concerns served by the procedural rules implicated in those cases. Where
efficiency is a primary concern of the procedural rule at issue, Justice Ginsburg's decisions tend
to reflect a concomitant emphasis on enhancing court efficiency. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,
519 U.S. 61 (1996); In re Korean Airlines, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also supra
notes 77-93 and 95-97 and accompanying text. In contrast, when Justice Ginsburg detects that
a procedural rule is especially concerned with ensuring fairness to litigants (e.g., FRCP 23), she
endeavors to construe and apply the rule so as to give effect to its accommodation of fairness.
As another example, Justice Ginsburg's different approaches to the mootness doctrine in Doe
v. Sullivan, 938 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1991), and Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520
U.S. 43 (1997), are also reconcilable under the rubric of values proceduralism. Justice Ginsburg
found that Arizonans presented a moot claim, whereas Sullivan did not. The difference turned
on the question of how, in her view, the mootness doctrine accommodates competing value
concerns. The mootness doctrine prevents the waste of judicial resources on extinguished
disputes, but it does not bar adjudication of controversies that are not truly resolved-i.e., those
that are "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Sullivan, 938 F.2d at 1376. In Sullivan,
the plaintiff had no opportunity to litigate his claim before the court, as the consent waivers
were withdrawn within three months. Justice Ginsburg perceived that the dispute at issue in that
case could foreseeably arise again in the future. Arizonans presented a different factual
circumstance. There, the plaintiff had been afforded her day in court, and the challenge to the
English Only law was kept alive in the Arizona state courts, assuring some form of judicial
review. See Serrano, supra note 175, at 222.
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procedures particularly, and process rules generally, to serve two important
functions. The first is to foster the perception that procedural rules make for
fair adjudication of disputes. Procedural fairness is integral to an individual's
assessment of the overall fairness of the judicial system, and sometimes, may
even alleviate misgivings about the fairness of the substantive result. The
second is to maintain the legitimacy of the judiciary. Procedural rules, as
components of legal process, bear heavily on the public's sense of the
integrity of the courts. Although no guarantor of appropriate judicial
behavior, procedure cultivates confidence among the public that the courts
will exercise their authority within a settled, pre-established framework. In
that sense, procedural rules instill a sense of stability to the judicial system,
as they are constants, to some degree, around which individuals may make
decisions regarding how to deal with their legal interests, rights, and claims.3
V. CONCLUSION
Portrayed as the consummate moderate, Justice Ginsburg's judicial philo-
sophy has often been described in terms loaded with political baggage. Such
descriptions fail to illuminate the complex value considerations informing her
judicial decisionmaking. Our examination of Justice Ginsburg's writings
reveals that the sometimes seemingly inconsistent themes in her process juris-
prudence-a flexible approach to procedural rules in one situation and strict
adherence in others-is instead what we have described as a values
proceduralism. As scholars and commentators of her judicial philosophy, we
should avoid misshapen political labels and instead, do justice for the Justice.
3" See Hardin, supra note 212, at 1988. The doctrine of stare decisis shares in the
conception of rules as an instrument of stability. Stare decisis indicates how a court may rule
on an issue that has been previously decided by precedent. See idL Posner, commenting on stare
decisis from a law and economics perspective, describes the body of precedents in an area of
law as a "stock of capital goods" that yields productive services over time. Posner, Economic
Analysis, supra note 213, at 419-21. Like settled rules of substantive law, rules of process and
procedure can form the basis of reliance interests.
